THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION 15 



the main point of Evolutionary philosophy. Accepting the 

 former alternative, and remaining Evolutionists, we are 

 driven to the conclusion that mind was potentially present 

 in the primordial elements out of which life, and man, as the 

 crown of zoological life upon this globe, emerged. 



This conclusion, to which the Evolutionist is driven, does 

 not imply that mind, regarded as the final synthesis of 

 biological functions in man, was not something apparently and 

 qualitatively different in the inorganic world as different, 

 for example, to our senses and our intelligence as heat is from 

 motion. 



We are aware of mind as intelligence. We do not discover 

 any sign of intelligence in the inorganic world. Yet we are 

 compelled by Evolution to conceive of intelligence as the 

 final outcome of vital processes which started from an 

 inorganic basis. 



When we apply the analogy of the Correlation of Forces 

 to this problem, we may surmise that what appears as intelli- 

 gence in the biological series was formerly the same power 

 existing under another manifestation in the inorganic series, 

 just as heat is a condition of motion. This would save us 

 from assuming a break in the evolutionary process, and 

 would enable us to comprehend how inorganic things seem 

 irreconcilably alien to organic things when viewed from our 

 present point of vision. In other words, the common sub- 

 stance of the world would now be thought of, in successive 

 moments of its evolution, first as endowed with the capacity 

 of form, next as endowed with the capacity of life and pro- 

 gressive consciousness in addition to form. 



Thus, instead of destroying the belief that mind constitutes 

 the whole universe, which we know alone through mind, the 

 analogy of the Correlation of Forces helps us to conceive why 

 mind appears to us at one period as inorganic form, and at 

 the next period as organised vitality. We derive from it 

 some ground for expecting that the passage of inorganic into 

 organic modes of the world-stuff will eventually be regarded 

 in the same way as the metamorphosis of heat into motion 

 is now conceived. Whether we choose to call that world- 



