iio8 LIFE : OUTLINES OF GENERAL BIOLOGY 



beavers. The differences between Human History and Organic 

 Evolution are in kind, not merely in degree. It is not only that man 

 is an organism of rational discourse, he is more or less aware of his 

 own past; he "makes history", and he controls his conduct in the 

 light of general ideas. Animals sometimes work towards a concrete 

 personal end, with something of intelligence as distinct from 

 instinct, but they do not give evidence of forming concepts. Man's 

 "reason", on the other hand, is beyond mere perceptual inference 

 or intelligence, and works with concepts, which he not only develops, 

 but uses in his endeavour to deliberately control his actions in 

 reference to an ideal. And the social heritage of gains registered 

 outside the organism altogether, as is slightly anticipated in bee- 

 hive and ant-hill, has become in man important and even dominant ; 

 and it should never be confused, as is still too common, with the 

 germ-plasmic "natural inheritance". It is thus necessary to clarify 

 our conception of Social Evolution proper; and this with some 

 fullness of argument and illustration. 



Organic Heredity and Social Heritage. — Everyone sees that 

 heredity is the main biological condition indispensable for human 

 continuance, and so for social existence; and it needs but little 

 acquaintance either with contemporary social life or past history 

 to see how deeply particular heredities can influence social life. 

 The eugenists, at present among the most active of human and social 

 biologists of practical aims, are constantly reminding us that 

 historic and even contemporary recognition of the importance of 

 heredity does not go far enough, without a more than corresponding 

 appreciation of its significance for the opening future; and this not 

 only as regards the preservation and, if possible, improvement of 

 organic and racial breeds, but above all for social preservation, 

 and progress too. All this the sociologist, of course, accepts and 

 teaches; yet after the eugenists' and all other biological contribu- 

 tions have been accepted, and that appreciatively, he turns round 

 upon the biologists with the proposition that where their valuable 

 and necessary contributions end, there sociology proper begins. 

 How so? Because the essential and characteristic task of this 

 science is not merely to elicit these contributions towards the 

 better understanding of societies and the conditions and needs 

 of civilisations, but to understand societies and civilisations 

 themselves. Hence beyond all the sociologist can learn from the 

 "preliminary sciences", as from the first he has described them — 

 though with due recognition of their being far more advanced and 

 better organised than is his comparatively recent and yet more 

 complex and difficult endeavour — he claims autonomy and dis- 

 tinctness for sociology, outside and beyond their respective range. 

 How is this justified? By pointing to something beyond organic 

 heredity altogether, the Social Heritage; that is, the cmnulative 



