IN TROD UCTION 1 7 



in a drawing. That is, while he may know the proper number of 

 windows in the front, he would fail, perhaps, in getting the due 

 proportions of each window, and this would be because that par- 

 ticular observation had never been called out by any function that 

 the house or window had performed for him. The window allowed 

 light to come into the interior, and he learned to know it from this 

 function, but he learned nothing more. 



So in the study of a tree. The lumberman recognizes a tree by 

 signs, most superficial, because his knowledge may end with know- 

 ing the kind of wood. The nurseryman by a glance merely at the 

 fruit recognizes the different kinds of apple trees in his orchard. 

 Both, however, might utterly fail in an attempt to draw the tree, 

 because its function, so far as they are concerned, has not demanded 

 that close and specific observation of form which must precede any 

 drawing. 



The fact seems to be that most people see just enough of an 

 object to enable them to dodge it. Very much observation, so called, 

 results in nothing more than a mere consciousness of the presence 

 of the object. No image of educative value is formed. It will be 

 a surprise to anyone to scrutinize closely the impressions received 

 from an object, even after looking steadfastly at it for some time. 

 He will find that he has been impressed chiefly by those character- 

 istics and properties which indicate a particular function. Other 

 characteristics and properties, no matter how important, lie indis- 

 tinctly in the background of his consciousness, and it requires con- 

 siderable effort, on returning to the observation, to bring them to 

 their proper relation in the image. 



Observation, therefore, does not become a vital part of the educa- 

 tional process because we wish to train the senses, but rather because 

 we wish the senses to train the individual. They can fulfil their 

 mission in furnishing data regarding the outside world only when 

 the mind has been prepared through the impulse of a strong motive 

 to receive them. The value of observation cannot be determined, 

 primarily, by the character of the object presented, but, rather, by 

 the attitude of mind which the pupil brings to it, or which the object 

 before him can induce and control. Like all other educational prob- 

 lems, observation finally resolves itself into one of purpose or 

 motive. There is no escape from this, and the only way to have it 



