THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY. 329 



corously loud. I have already dealt with this question 

 at some length in a previous chapter, and there is no 

 occasion for me to do more here than to emphasise 

 what I have already said. Germany in sole and undis- 

 puted control of Mesopotamia and the hinterland of 

 the Persian Gulf would be bad ; but Eussia with her 

 long land frontier, already stretching from Armenia 

 to Chinese Turkestan, with its ingrained tendency 

 towards expansion to the south, would be infinitely 

 worse. I have already pointed out that of these two 

 eventualities the chances are at present in favour of 

 the first, and I have also pointed out how it lies in 

 our power to modify such prospective position in our 

 favour. There can be little doubt that the Baghdad 

 railway will eventually be built, and it cannot be 

 too strongly urged that the real reason why this 

 country must participate in such a scheme should 

 not be lost sight of That reason is no desire to 

 pander to or inordinate affection for Germany, but 

 the protection of our own interests. It is of vital 

 importance that when the time comes for the British 

 Government to reconsider the question of the Bagh- 

 dad railway, they should secure for this country that 

 voice in the councils of the Imperial Ottoman Bail- 

 way Company which in her position she has every 

 right to demand. So that, when the history of the 

 question comes to be written, the next generation 

 may accord to the present that measure of gratitude 

 for securing to them a share of control of the land- 

 route to the East, that the present accords to the 

 past for a similar service rendered in connection with 

 the sea-route, which ensured our present position with 

 regard to the Suez Canal. 



