NA TURE-STUD Y AND MORALS 7 7 



with the fundamental point from which the humanities and science 

 have diverged. Having arrived at this, we may be able to deter- 

 mine whether the divergence is necessary, and to what limits it 

 should extend. 



In the first place, it must be remembered that it was the function 

 of all education in early times to teach dogmas which were usually^ 

 sunmied up in the form of a creed. This was equally true of both 

 the humanities and science. " The heavens declare the glory of 

 God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork," expressed the 

 essence of a creed which for centuries held the scientific thought 

 of the world as in the grip of a vise. In its relation to science 

 this creed was no less exacting than the dogma set up by the 

 humanities in regard to " the chief end of man." Modern science, 

 however, through its slow development, gradually drew away from 

 this creed-bound condition, and with the advent of Darwinism it 

 suddenly broke all the bonds that remained. Then, practically, for 

 almost the first time, men began to investigate nature with an open 

 mind. They began to hunt for the facts unbiased by prejudice or 

 by traditions, and utterly regardless of results. The world has 

 never expressed even a tithe of the debt which it owes to these 

 bold pioneers in true scientific thought and method. With almost 

 reckless abandon they turned their backs upon all creeds and all 

 philosophies and said : " We will know the facts. No matter 

 whether they teach rightly or wrongly, or whether they teach any- 

 thing at all, xve will have the facts." This independent attitude of 

 mind was absolutely necessary that solid foundations for natural 

 science should be laid. It was an attitude so entirely different 

 from what had ever been assumed before by the students of nature 

 that it is no wonder it was misunderstood. Throughout the past, 

 the so-called facts of science had been marshaled to prove the 

 preconceived notions of men ; not only their notions regarding 

 their relations to each other, but also to those regarding the mission 

 and destiny of things in general and of man in particular. It is 

 easy to understand how these scientists, divesting themselves of 

 every ulterior purpose in the investigation of the facts of nature, 

 should give rise to the widespread impression that they believed, 

 therefore, that the facts themselves zvere ivithout moral significance 

 in the lives of men. From that day forth science has seemed like a 

 purposeless study, except so far as it may incidentally minister to 



