I*M!/r/iolnffir(i/ liiiU'KflijntiiniM 233 



Tliero have been niany uiicoJiRidere<l opinions expressefl about composite 

 pliott)^nii]iliy ; they may w chiefly suniiiu-d up in the view expressed I>y a 

 well-known zoologist at the British Association Meeting at rlvmouth in 

 1898'. He sjiifl that he had never been able to see the scientihc vahie of 

 the composite pliotograiih. It represented the haphazjird obliteration of one 

 element by another. To which (ialton fitly replied that the value of the 

 composite photograj)h was that it brought out what was common to all the 

 comj)onents, while eliminating that which was exceptional. 



vVe shall postpone all further discussion of Gallon's work on Composite 

 Photography until the following chapter, but that work is oidy interpretable 

 when wo rememln'r its iKsychological origin : (ialton \\i\s inquiring into the 

 extent to which mentality is a.ssociated with physiognomy. 



In 1879 (Jalton published his first investigation mto the working of his 

 own mind. It was issued in two forms (littering a good deal in detail. The first 

 paper, entitled "Psychometric Kacts," a{)peared in the Xitwteeiith Cfntnry^, 

 and the secontl [>aper, with the title " Psychometric Experiments," in Brain*. 

 The twoarticleswere independently written, thelatterbemgthemore statistical, 

 i'he latter opens with the words: 



" Psychonietry, it is hardly lu'ccssnry to say, nu?an.s the art of imposing mea.surement and 

 nuiiiln^r upon oponvtiims of tlio mind, as in the practici> of detorniininp tho rt-actiimtimo of 

 different jH'rsons. I propose in this memoir to j^ive a new instance of psychtmietry, and a few 

 of its results. They may not \te of any very f;reat novelty or importance, hut they are at least 

 definite, and admit of verifioition ; therefore I trust it requires no apology for offering them 

 to tho readers of this .Journal, who will be prepared to agree in the view, that until the 

 phenomena of any branch of knowledge have been submitted to measurt^ment and number, it 

 cannot lussume the status and dignity of a science." (p. 148*.) 



Galton divides thought into two main categories. In the first category 

 ideas present themselves by association with some object newly perceived by 

 the senses, or with previous ideas. In the second such of the.se a.ssociated 

 ideas, as happen to be germane to the topic on which the mind is set, 

 are fixed by attention, (ialton's investigation applied entirely to the first 

 category, the automatic arising of ideas by ii.s.sociation ; they come of their 

 own accord and cannot, except in indirect and imperfect ways, be com{»elled 

 to come. The inquiry dealt with the rate at which these associated ideas 

 come ; their .sjunene.ss and their difl'erence, and the periods of life in which 

 they were originally formed. He remarks that the experiments were 

 "exceedingly trying and irksome, and that it reciuired much resolution to go 

 through with them, using the scrupulous care tney demanded." This it is 

 easy for the reader to verify ; I have personally tried it on Galton's actual 

 teat list of words ; my chief tlifticulty being the reluctance of associated ideas 

 to appear, and their utter triviality compure<l with Galton's experience. As 

 Galton himself says : 



"When we attempt to trace tho first step in each operation of our mind, we are usually 

 baulked by the didioulty of keeping watch, without embarrassing the freedom of its action. 



• Tiin«» Report of Section D, Sept<«mber 10th, 1898. 



' March, 1879, pp. t2.')-33. ' Vol. ii, pp. 149-57. 



* The last .sentence was adopted many years ago as the motto of tl\e liiom^tri- Lnhoratory. 



po n 30 



