SECT. XV. 3. 4. CLASSES OF IDEAS. 99 



voluntarily continue to excite one train of ideas, fuppofe the de- 

 fign of raifing water by a machine ; and at the fame time attend 

 to all other ideas, which are connected with this by every kind 

 of catenation ; and combine or feparate them voluntarily for the 

 purpofe of obtaining fome end. 



For we can create nothing new, we can only combine or fepa- 

 rate the ideas, which we have already received by our percep- 

 tions : thus if I wifh to reprefent a monfter, I call to my mind 

 the ideas of everything difagreeable and horrible, ;md combine 

 the naftinefs and gluttony of a hog, the ftupidity and obftinacy 

 of an afs, with the fur and awkwardnefs of a bear, and call the 

 new combination Caliban. Yet fuch a monfter may exift in 

 nature, as all his attributes are parts of nature. So when I ui(h 

 to reprefent every thing, that is excellent and amiable ; when I 

 combine benevolence with cheerfulnefs, wiidom, knowledge, 

 tafte, wit, beauty of perfon, and elegance of manners, and a fib- 

 ciate them in one lady as a pattern to the world, it is called in- 

 vention ; yet fuch a perfon may exift, fuch a perfon does ex> 

 ift ! It is , who is as much a monfter as Caliban. 



4. In refpecl to confcioufnef?, we are only confciotis of our 

 exiftence, when we think about it ; as we only perceive the 

 lapfe of time, when we attend to it ; when we are bufied about 

 other objedls, neither the lapfe of time nor the confcioufnefs of 

 our own exiftence can occupy our attention. Hence, when we 

 think of our own exigence, we only excite abftracled or reflex; 

 ideas, (as they are termed), of our principal pieatures or pains, of 

 our defires or averfions, or of the figure, foJidity, colour, or 

 other properties of our bodies, and call that ad of the fenfori- 

 um a confcioufnefs of our exiftence. Some philoibpher, I be- 

 lieve it is Des Cartes, has faid " I think, therefore, I exift." ' 

 But this is not right reafoning, becaufe thinking is a mode of 

 exiftence ; and it is thence only faying, " I exift, therefore I 

 exift." For there are three modes of exiftence, or in the lan- 

 guage of grammarians three kinds of verbs Fivft, (imply I am, 

 or exift. Secondly, I am acling, or exift in a ftate of activity, 

 as I move. Thirdly, I am fuffering, or exift in a ftare of being 

 acled upon, as lam moved. The when, and the where, as ap- 

 plicable to this exiftence, depends on the fucceflive motions cf 

 our own or of other bodies; and on their refpective fuuations, 

 as fpoken of, Seel XIV. 2. 5. 



5. Our identity is known by our acquired habits or catenated 

 trains of ideas and mufcular motions ; and perhaps, when we 

 compare infancy with old age, in thofe alone can our identity be 

 fuppofed ro exift. For what elfe is there of fimilitude between 

 thefirft fpeck of living entity and the mature man ? every de- 

 duction 



