NOVUM ORGANUM. 



167 



. 



est ut sit aliquid extremum aut extimum mundi, sed semper 

 quasi necessario occurrit ut sit aliquid ulterius l : neque rursus 

 cogitari potest quomodo aeternitas defluxerit ad hunc diem; 

 cum distinctio ilia quse recipi consuevit, quod sit infinitum a 

 parte ante et a parte post, nullo modo constare possit; quia 

 inde sequeretur, quod sit unum infinitum alio infinite majus, 

 atque ut consumatur infinitum, et vergat ad finitum. Similis 

 est subtilitas de lineis semper divisibilibus 2 , ex impotentiajcogi- 

 tationis. At majore cum pernicie interyenit liaec impotentia 

 mentis in inventione causarum : nam cum maxime universalia in 

 natuife positiya esse deoeantjjquemadniodum invenluntur, neque 

 sunt revera causaoina ; famen intellectus humanus, nescius ac- 

 quiescere, adhuc appetit npfabraT^Tum vero ad ulteriora tendens 

 ad proximiora recidit, videlicet ad causas finales, quse sunt 

 plane ex natura hominis potius quam universi 3 ; atque ex hoc 

 fonte philosophiam miris modis corruperunt. Est autem aeque 

 imperiti et leviter philosophantis, in maxime universalibus cau- 

 sam requirere, ac in suborclinatis et subalternis causam non 

 desiderare. 4 



XLIX. 



Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est 5 ; sed recipit infu- 



1 Thus Leibnitz derived from the principle of sufficient reason a proof of the infinite 

 extent of the universe, alleging that if it were of finite dimensions no reason could 

 be given for its occupying any one region of space rather than any other. 



2 In the phrase " subtilitas de lineis semper divisibilibus," reference is made to Ari- 

 stotle, who in several places in his writings (particularly in the tract irepl afr6p.a>v 7pa/t- 

 ndruv) maintains that in theory every magnitude is divisible sine limite. 



3 This censure appears to be expressed without sufficient limitation ; for it is difficult 

 to assent to the assertion that the notion of the final cause, considered generally, is 

 more ex natura hominis than that of the efficient. The subject is one of which it is 

 difficult to speak accurately ; but it may be said that wherever we think that we re- 

 cognise a tendency towards a fulfilment or realisation of an idea, there the notion of 

 the final cause comes in. It can only be from inadvertence that Professor Owen has 

 set the doctrine of the final cause as it were in antithesis to that of the unity of type : 

 by the former he means the doctrine that the suitability of an animal to its mode of 

 life is the one thing aimed at or intended in its structure. It cannot be doubted that 

 Aristotle would have recognised the preservation of the type as not less truly a final 

 cause than the preservation of the species or than the well-being of the individual. 

 The final cause connects itself with what in the language of modern German philo- 

 sophy is expressed by the phrase " the Idea in Nature." 



4 fan ^etp aTTaiStvffia rb ^ yiyvdaiteii/ ilvuv 5eT fVjTeTv cbnJSetlij' nal TIVUV ov 5e7, 

 SAws fj.ei> 7ap aTrdvTcav afivvarov a.Tr68etiv cTveW ets &ireipov "yhp &j/ j3a8(bc Sore /dj5' 

 OWTCOS elvai aTr68eiiv. Metaph.,iii. 4. 



5 Heraclitus apud Plut, De Esu Carnium. This doctrine of Idols is spoken of 

 with great disrespect by Spinoza. He asserts that neither Des Cartes nor Bacon ever 

 perceived the true source of error, and adds : " De Bacone parum dicam, qui de 

 hac re admodum confuse loquitur, et fere nihil probat, sed tantum narrat : " and 

 concludes by saying, " quas adhuc alias causas adsignat (he has just enumerated 



M 4 



