550 DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM 



sophiae Primae, communia et promiscua Scientiarum Axiomata 

 assignavimus. Etiam Relativas et Adventitias Entium Condi- 

 tiones (quas Transcendentes nominavimus), Multum, Paucum ; 

 Idem, Diversum ; Possibile, Impossibile ; et hoc genus reliqua, 

 eidem attribuimus : id solummodo cavendo, ut physice, non 

 logice tractentur. At inquisitionem de Deo, Uno, Bono, 

 Angelis, Spiritibus, ad Theologiam Naturalem retulimus. 

 Merito igitur quaeri possit quid tandem sit quod Metaphysicse 

 relinquatur? Certe ultra Naturam nihil; sed ipsius Naturae 

 pars multo prasstantissima. Atque profecto, citra veritatis 

 dispendium, hue usque de veterum sententia respondere liceat, 

 Physicam ea tractare quae penitus in materia mersa sunt et 

 mobilia, Metaphysicam abstracta magis et constantia. Kursus, 

 Physicam in natura supponere existentiam tantum et motum 

 et naturalem necessitatem ; at Metaphysicam etiam mentem 

 et ideam. Nam hue forte redit ea quam dicemus res. Verum 

 nos earn, missa sermonis sublimitate, perspicue et familiariter 

 proponemus. Partiti sumus Naturalem Philosophiam in Cau- 

 sarum Inquisitionem et Productionem Effectuum. Inquisitio- 

 nem Causarum in Theoricam conjecimus. Earn in Physicam et 

 Metaphysicam partiti sumus. Ergo necesse est, ut vera diffe- 

 rentia harum sumatur ex natura causarum quas inquirunt. 

 Itaque absque aliqua obscuritate aut circuitione, Physica est 

 quae inquirit de Efficiente et Materia ; Metaphysica quas de 

 Forma et Fine. 1 



Physica igitur Causarum vaga et incerta et pro modo 

 subjecti mobilia complectitur ; Causarum constantiam non as- 

 sequitur. 



Limus ut hie durescit, et hsec ut cera liquescit, 

 Uno eodemque igne. 2 



1 The classification of causes here referred to is Aristotle's. In the first book of the 

 Metaphysics he has applied it, with singular felicity, to the history of philosophical 

 speculation. In order to apprehend its nature, it is necessary to take the word cause 

 in a wider signification than is ordinarily done. 



The efficient cause is that which acts the material cause that which is acted on ; 

 as when the fire melts wax, the former is the efficient, the latter the material cause 

 of the effect produced. The formal cause is that which in the case of any object de- 

 termines it to be that which it is, and is thus the cause of its various properties ; it 

 is thus the "ratio essentise," the "\6yos TTJS otiaias" The final cause is that for the 

 sake of which any effect takes place, whether the agent is or is not intelligent; semper 

 enim intenditur finis, non autem semper cognoscitur. These four kinds of causes may 

 be divided into two classes, extrinsic and intrinsic ; the efficient and final belonging to 

 the first class, the material and formal to the second. It is obvious that these dis- 

 tinctions involve the postulate of what has been called the theory of physical influence, 

 that is, that one substance really acts on another, and must at least be modified if we 

 adopt any such theory on this subject as that of Leibnitz or of Herbart. 



8 Virg. Ed. viii. 80. 



