606 DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM 



haberi? Quinimo ab eadem inspiratione divina hauriatur, a 

 qua Substantia Animae primo emanavit. 1 



Doctrina vero de Anima Sensibili sive Producta, etiam qua- 

 tenus ad Substantiam ejus, vere inquiritur; at ea inquisitio 

 nobis quasi desiderari videtur. Quid enim ad doctrinam 

 de Substantia Animse faciunt Actus Ultimus et Forma Cor- 

 poris, et hujusmodi nugae logicae 2 ? Anima siquidem Sen- 

 sibilis sive Brutorum plane substantia corporea censenda 

 est, a calore attenuata et facta invisibilis; aura (inquam) 

 ex natura flammea et aerea conflata, aeris mollitie ad impres- 

 sionem recipiendam, ignis vigore ad actionem vibrandam, do- 

 tata; partim ex oleosis, partim ex aqueis nutrita; corpore 

 obducta, atque in animalibus perfectis in capite prascipue locata., 

 in nervis percurrens, et sanguine spirituoso arteriarum refecta 

 et reparata ; quemadmodum Bernardinus Telesius, et disci- 

 pulus ejus Augustinus Donius, aliqua ex parte non omnino 

 inutiliter asseruerunt. 3 Itaque de hac doctrina diligentior fiat 

 inquisitio ; eo magis, quod haec res non bene intellecta opi- 

 niones superstitiosas et plane contaminatas, et dignitatem 

 Animae Humanae pessime conculcantes, de Metempsychosi et 

 Lustrationibus Animarum per periodos annorum, denique de 

 nimis propinqua Anima3 Humanae erga animas brutorum per 

 omnia cognatione, peperit. Est autem hasc Anima in brutis 



1 The anima rationalis is immaterial, the anima sensibilis is as much material as 

 any other part of man's frame. To it however Telesius, whom Bacon here follows, 

 ascribes sensation, imagination, &c., leaving the higher faculties, and especially the 

 moral sense as the portion of the anima rationalis. Donius, to whom Bacon refers a 

 little further on, in effect rejects the anima rationalis altogether ; admitting, in appa- 

 rently insincere deference to received opinions, that it may exist ; but holding that, if 

 it does so, it is incognisable by human reason. 



2 Bacon refers to the Aristotelian definition of the soul, "Actus primus corporis 

 physici organic! vitam potentia habentis," and to the doctrine immediately connected 

 with this definition that the soul is the form of man. It is obvious that the actus 

 primus may also be spoken of as actus ultimus, according to the direction in which the 

 arrangement proceeds, but I do not know whether Bacon had any reason for deviating 

 from the usual phraseology. 



With respect to the phrase " forma corporis," it is to be remarked that the Scotista 

 maintained the existence of a * forma corporis," that namely which gives the body 

 corporeity distinct from the informing principle or soul of man ; a subtlety intro- 

 duced to evade the difficulties which the gradual development of the body from its 

 first rudiments to perfection, that is, its gradual progress to corporeity, appears to 

 present when contrasted with the way in which the rational soul is infused. For it was 

 a received opinion that the soul is not " ex traduce," that is, not derived from that of 

 the progenitor, but on the contrary is infused as it were ab extra into the body it 

 informs. 



1 See the fifth book of Telesius De Rerum Natura, and the second book, parti- 

 cularly the fourth and fifth chapters, of Donius De Natura Hominis ; and compare 

 Carnpanella De Sensu Rerum, ii. 4. Campanella follows Telesius more closely than 

 Donius does. 



