610 DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM 



vero compressiones et dilatationes et agitationes spiritus (qui 

 proculdubio motus fons est) corpoream et crassam partium 

 molem flectat, excitet, aut pellat, adhuc diligenter inquisitum 

 et tractatum non est. Neque mirum, cum Anima ipsa Sensibilis 

 hactenus potius pro entelecliia et functione quadam liabita sit, 

 quam pro substantia. 1 At quando jam innotuerit ipsam esse 

 substantiam corpoream et materiatam, necesse est etiam ut 

 quibus nixibus aura tam pusilla et tenera corpora tarn crassa et 

 dura in motu ponere possit inquiratur. De liac parte igitur, 

 cum desideretur, fiat inquisitio. 



At de Sensu et Sensibili longe uberior et diligentior adhibita 

 est inquisitio, tam in tractatibus circa ea generalibus quam 

 in artibus specialibus, utpote Perspectiva, Musica; quam vere, 

 nihil ad institutum; quandoquidem ilia tanquam Desiderata 

 ponere non liceat. Sunt tamen duas partes nobiles et insignes, 

 quas in hac doctrina desiderari statuimus ; altera de Differentia 

 Perceptionis et Sensus, altera de Forma Lucis. 



Atque differentiam inter Perceptionem et Sensum bene 

 enucleatam debuerant philosophi tractatibus suis de Sensu 

 et Sensibili praemittere, ut rem maxime fundamentalem. 

 Videmus enim quasi omnibus corporibus naturalibus inesse 

 vim manifestam percipiendi; etiam electionem quandam arnica 

 amplectendi, inimica et aliena fugiendi. Neque nos de 

 subtilioribus perceptionibus tantum loquimur; veluti cum 

 mngnes ferrum allicit ; flamma ad naphtham assilit ; bulla 

 bullse approximata co'it; radiatio ab objecto albo dissilit ; 

 corpus animalis utilia assimilat, inutilia excernit; spongia3 pars 

 (etiam super aquam elevata) aquam attrahit, aerem expellit ; 

 et hujusmodi. Etenim quid attinet talia enumerare ? Nullurn 

 siquidem corpus ad aliud admotum illud immutat aut ab illo 

 immutatur, nisi operationem prcecedat Perceptio reciproca. 



1 In the school philosophy, at least among the Realists, every substantial form (and 

 the soul among the rest) was regarded as a substance. This of course implies the 

 possibility of its independent existence, though, as form and matter are correlatives, 

 it is difficult to understand how either can exist apart from the other. This difficulty 

 however seems to have been completely surmounted or set aside ; and thus, for instance, 

 St. Thomas Aquinas affirms that angels are immaterial forms (Sum. Theol. i. 61). 

 Bacon's remark that the soul had hitherto been looked on rather as a function than a 

 substance refers, I think, to Melancthon's exposition of the Aristotelian doctrine. 

 For Melancthon, whose views of the Peripatetic philosophy had long great influence in the 

 Protestant universities, affirms that, according to the true view of Aristotle's oph.'on, 

 the soul is not a substance but an tvrt\4x eia or functio. The word cvreXexeia he 

 conceives to be only a modification of eVScAe'xeict, which he proposes to render * habi- 

 tualis agitatio seu 5iW;uis quaedam ciens actiones." See his De Anima, c. 15. 



