808 DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM 



De Exemplis , et usu eorum. 1 

 APHORISMUS 21. 



De Exemplis jam dicendum est, ex quibus Jus hauriendum 

 sit, ubi Lex deficit. Atque de Consuetudine, quae Legis species 

 est, deque Exemplis qua3 per frequentem usum in consuetu- 

 dinem transierunt, tanquam Legem Tacitam, suo loco dicemus. 

 Nunc autem de exemplis loquimur quae raro et sparsim inter- 

 veniunt, nee in legis vim coaluerunt ; quandd et qua cautione 

 norma Juris ab ipsis petenda sit, cum Lex deficiat. 



APHORISMUS 22. 



Exempla a temporibus bonis et moderatis petenda sunt ; non 

 tyrannicis, aut factiosis, aut dissolutis. Hujusmodi exempla 

 temporis partus spurii sunt, et magis nocent quam decent. 



APHORISMUS 23. 



In exemplis, recentiora habenda sunt pro tutioribus. Quod 

 enim paulo ante factum est, unde nullum sit secutum incom- 

 modum, quidni iterum repetatur ? Sed tamen minus habent 

 authoritatis recentia ; et si forte res in melius restitui opus sit, 

 recentia exempla magis saeculum suum sapiunt quam rectam 

 rationem. 



APHORISMUS 24. 



At vetustiora exempla caute, et cum delectu, recipienda. 

 Decursus siquidem aetatis multa mutat ; ut quod tempore 

 videatur antiquum, id perturbatione et inconformitate ad 

 praesentia sit plane novum. Medii itaque temporis exempla 

 sunt optima, vel etiam talis temporis quod cum tempore 

 currente plurimum conveniat; quod aliquando praestat tern- 

 pus remotius magis quam in proximo. 



1 It is to be observed, that the principle on which the English courts have pro- 

 ceeded, namely, that a decision on a point not previously decided on is to be accepted 

 merely as a declaration of an already existing law virtually contained in the unwritten 

 corpus juris entitled the Common Law, has had the effect of giving nearly equal 

 weight to all cases decided by a competent tribunal. On the other hand, we find in 

 the history of French jurisprudence that great uncertainty has existed as to the degree 

 of authority to which a "res judicata " was entitled ; the principle that " res judicata 

 pro veritate accipitur " extending only to the parties between whom the actual decision 

 was had. Thus it is related that De Thou was in the habit of saying, when it was 

 mentioned that in a case similar to the one before him a decree had been given in 

 favour of the plaintiff or defendant, " (Vest bon pour lui; " implying that it was not. of 

 authority in any other case. The Parliament of Paris was for a long time in the habit 

 of distinguishing the decisions to the principle of which it intended to give force of law 

 from other decisions, by a more solemn form of delivering judgment ; thereby in effect 

 claiming what our courts have never claimed, namely, a power of making new law. 

 A collection has been published of these quasi-legislative decisions, with the title of 

 " Arrets rendus en robe rouge." It is evident that the practice of the Parliament of 

 Paris, which was probably followed by other of the French Parliaments, escapes from 

 some of the inconveniences of the English theory. 



