LIBER OCTAVUS. 811 



(ut antea dictum est) non sufficit casibus ; sed ad ea quae 

 plerunque accidunt aptatur, Sapientissima autem res Tempus 1 

 (ut ab antiquis dictum est), et novorum casuum quotidie author 

 et inventor. 



APHORISMUS 33. 



Interveniunt autem novi casus, et in Criininalibus, qui poena 

 indigent ; et in Civilibus, qui auxilio. Curias quae ad priora 

 ilia respiciunt, Ccnsorias ; quae ad posteriora, Prcetorias appel- 

 lamus. 



APHORISMUS 34. 



Habento Curiae Censoriae jurisdictionem et potestatem, non 

 tantum nova delicta puniendi, sed etiam poenas a legibus con- 

 stitutas pro delictis veteribus augendi ; si casus fuerint odiosi et 

 enormes, modo non sint capitales. Enorme enim tanquam 

 novum est. 



APHORISMUS 35. 



Habeant similiter Curae Praetoriae potestatem, tarn subve- 



of his Institutes, which was written in his old age, when he was regarded as the great 

 champion of the people against the Crown, speaks of it in terms as favourable as ever 

 Bacon did. " It is the most honourable Court" (he says) " our parliament excepted 

 that is in the Christian world, both in respect of the Judges of the Court, and of their 

 honourable proceeding according to their just jurisdiction, and the ancient and just orders 

 of the Court." And I cannot help thinking that modern constitutional writers have 

 judged of it too hastily from the accidental and exceptional circumstances which led to 

 its abolition. It was an instrument of government. When the government was oppressive 

 and unjust, it was an instrument of oppression and injustice. So, also, at many periods 

 of our history have the Courts of Common Law been. But if we would know whether 

 a Court constituted like the Star-Chamber had any necessary tendency to become an 

 instrument of oppression, we must consider it in connexion with the rest of the con- 

 stitution. Was it in any especial manner under the command of the Crown ? Cer- 

 tainly not : it was under the command of the Crown so far only and so long only as 

 the whole powers of government were under the command of the Crown. So far and 

 so long as the King could appoint his own ministers and maintain them and carry on 

 the government with them in spite of the House of Commons, so far and so long he 

 could exercise an effectual control over the proceedings of a Court constituted like the 

 Star-Chamber ; no farther and no longer. The body of the Court was composed of 

 the chief officers of the government ; less than eight did not make a quorum ; 

 their proceedings were public ; each member gave his own sentence with the reasons ; 

 the majority decided ; the decree was solemnly recorded. As soon as the theory of a 

 responsible ministry was recognised, and the impossibility of carrying on the govern- 

 ment without money voted by the House of Commons gave the people an effective 

 check upon the Crown, they would have had a check equally effective upon the pro- 

 ceedings of a court of justice so constituted. Any abuse of its authority would have 

 led to a change of ministry, and to the transfer of that authority to other hands. 



With regard to the Court of Chancery, it is less easy to say how it would have worked 

 had its jurisdiction been exercised according to the conditions here prescribed for the 

 Curiae Praetorife ; one of which is, that it was not to be confided to a single man. 

 " Curiae illae" (i. e. Curise Censoriae et Prcetorice, see Aph. 36.) " uni viro ne commit- 

 tantur, sed ex pluribus constent." And in speculating upon the evil which it might 

 have become with powers so indefinite, we must not forget how great an evil it has 

 actually become in consequence of the rules by which its discretion has been defined 

 and limited. The nearest approach to certainty attained by the existing system appears 

 to be the certainty of damage to both parties. J. S.] 



1 6 a\fj6f<rraros \ey6(*.?i>os xp6vos flvai. Xenoph, Hellenic, iii. 3. 2. 



