824 DE AUGMENTIS SCIENT1ARUM 



sparsa, et abbreviant fusa et prolixa in lege. Cavendum autem 

 est, ne summae istae reddant homines promptos ad practicam, 

 cessatores in scientia ipsa. Earum enim officium est tale, ut 

 ex iis recolatur jus, non perdiscatur. Summae autem omnino 

 magna diligentia, fide, et judicio sunt conficienda, ne fur turn 

 faciant legibus. 



APHORISMUS 88. 



Formulas Agendi diversas in unoquoque genere colligito. 

 Nam et practice hoc interest; et certe pandunt illae oracula 

 et occulta legum. Sunt enim non pauca qua3 latent in legibus, 

 at in formulis agendi melius et fusius perspiciuntur ; instar 

 pugni et palmae. 



De Responsis et Consultis. 



APHORISMUS 89. 



Dubitationes Particulares quas de tempore in tempus emer- 

 gunt dirimendi et solvendi, aliqua ratio iniri debet. Durum 

 enim est ut ii qui ab errore cavere cupiant ducem viae non in- 

 veniant, verum ut actus ipsi periclitentur, neque sit aliquis 

 ante rem peractam juris praenoscendi modus. -. 



APHOKISMUS 90. 



Responsa Prudentum, quas petentibus dantur de jure sive 

 ab advocatis sive a doctoribus, tanta valere authoritate ut ab 

 eorum sententia judici recedere non sit licitum, non placet. 1 

 Jura a Juratis Judicibus sumunto. 



APHORISMUS 91. 



Tentari judicia per causas et personas fictas, ut eo modo 

 experiantur homines qualis futura sit legis norma, non placet. 3 



1 By the Roman Jurists the Responsa prudentium are reckoned among the Fontes 

 Juris, but there are few points in the history of Roman law on which it is more diffi- 

 cult to form a satisfactory opinion. We have no satisfactory information either as to 

 the form in which these Responsa were given, or as to the degree of authority with 

 which they were invested. The common opinion is, that they received absolute force 

 of law in virtue of an ordinance of Augustus, and that more precise regulations with 

 respect to cases in which a diversity of opinion existed were made by Hadrian. The 

 connexion between them and the law of citations of Honorius and Valentinian is also 

 a matter of much obscurity. See Backing's Pandekten, i. p. 36. Walter, Gesch. d. R. 

 Rechts, 409. and 421. Hugo, Gesch. d, /?. Rechts, 313. and 385. 



* Lord Ellen borough refused to try a case in which a bet had been made on a point 

 of law. He asked, it is said, to see the record, and threw it down " with much in- 

 dignation." Tradition adds that he threw it at the head of the plaintiff's attorney. 

 Until lately, when it was found necessary in proceedings in equity to have the decision 

 of a jury on a question of fact, recourse was had to the machinery of a feigned issue ; 

 that is, an action was brought on an imaginary wager as to the truth or falsehood of 

 an agreed upon statement of facts. Possibly in Bacon's time a similar course may 

 have been adopted in order to obtain the opinion of the judges on points of law. In 



