80 THE EVOLUTION OF MAN. 



it monistically : and this attempt of his to explain the 

 origin of the entire world by means of naturally working 

 causes (causce ejfidentes), forms to this day the basis of 

 all our natural cosmogony. But, on the other hand, Kant 

 maintained that the " principle of the mechanism of nature 

 here applied, without which, after all, there could be no 

 science of nature," was wholly inadequate to explain the 

 phenomena of organic nature, and especially the origin of 

 organisms; that it was necessary to assume supernatural 

 causes effecting a design (causce finales) for the origin of 

 these natural bodies constructed with design. Indeed, he 

 even went so far as to assert that "it is quite certain 

 we cannot become adequately acquainted with organized 

 beings, and their inner possibilities, by purely mechanical 

 principles of nature, much less are we able to explain 

 them ; and that this is so much the case that we may boldly 

 assert that it is not rational for man even to enter upon 

 such speculations, or to expect that a Newton will ever 

 arise who, by natural laws not ordered by design, can 

 render the production of a blade of grass intelligible ; in 

 fact, we are compelled utterly to deny that it is possible 

 for man ever to reach such knowledge." In these words 

 Kant most definitely declared the dualistic and teleological 

 standpoint which he adopted in the science of organic 

 nature. 



Kant sometimes, however, departed from this stand- 

 point, especially in some very remarkable passages which 

 I have discussed at some length in the fifth chapter of my 

 " History of Creation," in which he has expressed himself 

 in quite the opposite, or monistic sense. With reference tc 

 these passages, as I there showed, he might even be declared 



