MORAL NATURE. 317 



But this rests upon a complete misunderstanding 

 of the subject. All of this sort of argument is 

 interesting and valuable, since it indicates the devel- 

 opment of our ideas as to what is right and'what is 

 wrong. But instead of showing the moral sense to 

 be different in different people, it proves its univer- 

 sal existence. No intuitionalist even for a moment 

 pretended that men are born with a knowledge of 

 right and wrong acts. The point is not that all men 

 believe the same things to be right or wrong, but 

 that all men believe something to be right. No 

 matter how differently conditioned be the races of 

 men, no matter how diverse their ideas as to right 

 and wrong actions, every person believes that there 

 are some things right to do and some things wrong 

 to do. A right and a wrong exist for every race, 

 and the imperious word ought, is everywhere under- 

 stood. It makes no difference to what specific acts 

 men apply these terms so long as they apply them 

 at all, and recognize that those things which they 

 consider right ought to be done. Nor does it make 

 any difference here, how we attempt to account for 

 the reason for doing right. It is a widespread con- 

 ception that we are to be punished for wrong-doing 

 either spiritually or temporarily. Students of eth- 

 ics tell us that it is necessary to assume some ulti- 

 mate good as the final justification of Tightness. 

 Now this may indeed be of importance when we 

 consider the origin of this moral sense, but it has no 

 significance in considering its existence. People 

 throughout the world act in certain ways because 

 they feel it is right, and not because they feel it to 



