THE MORAL SENSE. 327 



people would unhesitatingly answer no. A person 

 who performs an act because he feels it to be right, 

 is conscious that this act comes under a category 

 entirely different from what he calls instinct. It is 

 an instinct for a child to suck, but no one calls it a 

 moral act. Indeed, none of the actions of children 

 are considered moral, and yet they have instincts. 

 We feel a great difference between these two classes 

 of actions, though it may be difficult to define it. 

 The one is followed blindly ; the other is debated 

 over, and not un frequently the question arises as to 

 which of two courses is right a question impossible 

 in regard to instincts proper. This difference is sel- 

 dom appreciated by the evolutionist, though it is 

 not entirely overlooked. When or how the instincts 

 which are at the base of the moral nature became 

 changed in their nature, they do not clearly indi- 

 cate. But in some way, they say, long-continued 

 repetition from generation to generation caused 

 them to become regarded as authoritative, and thus 

 to constitute duty. 



So long as this change in nature is not explained, 

 development cannot be considered as meeting the 

 question at issue. It is of no use to trace the de- 

 velopment of the moral nature or the origin of social 

 instincts, unless it can be shown that they are the 

 same. Darwin has not yet shown this, and few 

 would be inclined to admit it. It is hardly worth 

 while to pursue this matter further. Enough has 

 been said to indicate the position of the two sides. 

 The evolutionists claim that conscience is simply a 

 modified instinct, that the moral nature has arisen 



