SECT. XIV. 2. PRODUCTION OF IDEAS. 1 1$ 



that we pofTefs a power to move" our own bodies, 

 we experience, that thofe objects, which excite in 

 us the idea of folidity and of figure, oppofe this 

 voluntary movement of our own organs ; as whilft 

 I endeavour to comprefs between my hands an 

 ivory ball into a fpheroid. And we are hence 

 taught by experience, that our own body, and thofe 

 which we touch, cannot exift in the fame part of 

 fpace. 



But this by no means demonftrates, that no two 

 bodies can exift together in the fame part of fpace. 

 Galilseo in the preface to his works feems to be of 

 opinion, that matter is not impenetrable ; Mr. 

 Michel, arid Mr. Bofcowich in his Theoria Philof. 

 Natur. have efpoufed this hypothecs ; which has 

 been lately publifhed by Dr. Prieftley, to whom the 

 world is much indebted for fo many important dif- 

 coveries in fcience. (Hift. of Light and Colours, 

 p. 391.) The uninterrupted paflage of light through 

 transparent bodies, of the electric aether through 

 metallic and aqueous bodies, and of the magnetic 

 effluvia through all bodies, would feem to give fome 

 probability to this opinion. Hence it appears, that 

 beings may exift without poffeffing the property 

 of folidity, as well as they can exift without poffef- 

 fing the properties, which excite our fmell or tafte, 

 and can thence occupy fpace without detruding 

 other bodies from it ; but we cannot become ac- 

 quainted with fuch beings by our fenfe of touch, 

 any more than we can with odours or flavours 

 without our fenfes of fmell and tafte. 



But that any being can exift without exifting in 

 fpace, is to my ideas utterly incomprehenfible. 

 My appeal is to common fenfe. To be implies a 

 when and a where ; the one is comparing it with 

 the motions of other beings, and the other with 

 their fituations. 



If 



