SECT. XV. i. CLASSES OF IDEAS. 137 



5. And thofe that are lefs complex than the cor- 

 refpondent natural objects, have been termed al> 

 ftracted ideas ; thus fweetnefs, and whitenefs, and 

 folidity, are received at the fame time from a lump 

 of fugar, yet I can recollect any of thefe qualities 

 without thinking of the others, that were excited 

 along with them. 



When ideas are fo far abftracted as in the above 

 example, they have been termed fimple by the 

 writers of metaphyfics, and^feem indeed to be more 

 complete repetitions of the ideas or fenfual motions, 

 originally excited by external objects. 



Other clailes o. thefe ideas, where the abftrac- 

 tion has not been fo great, have been termed, by 

 Mr. Locke, modes, fubftances, and relations, but 

 they feem only to differ in their degree of abftrac- 

 tion from the complex ideas that were at firft ex> 

 cited ; for as thefe complex or natural ideas are 

 themfelves imperfect copies of their correfpondent 

 perceptions, fo thefe abftract or general ideas are 

 only ftiil more imperfect copies of the fame per- 

 ceptions. Thus when I have feen an object but 

 once, as a rhinoceros, my abftract idea of this ani- 

 mal is the fame as my complex one. I may think 

 more or lefs diftin&ly of a rhinoceros, but it is the 

 very rhinoceros that I faw, or fome part or proper- 

 ty of him, which recurs to my mind. 



But when any clafs of complex obje&s becomes 

 the fubject of converfation, of which I have feen 

 many individuals, as a caftle or an army, fome 

 property or circumftance belonging to it is peculi- 

 arly alluded to ; and then I feel in my own mind, 

 that my abftracfc idea of this complex object is only 

 an idea of that part, property, or attitude of it, 

 that employs the prefent converfation, and varies 

 with every fentence that is fpoken concerning it. 

 So if any ooe fhould fay, " one may fit upon a 



horfe 



