j 14* CLASSES OF IDEAS. SECT. XV. 3. 



cite abftracted or reflex ideas (as they are termed), 

 of our principal pleafures or pains, of our defires 

 or avernons, or of the figure, folidity, colour, or 

 other properties of our bodies, and call that aft of 

 the .fenforium a confcioufnefs of our exiftence. 

 Some philofophers, I believe it is Des Cartes, has 

 faid, " I think, therefore I exift." But this is not 

 right reafoning, becaufe thinking is a mode of ex- 

 iftence ; and it is thence only faying, " I exift, 

 therefore I exift." For there are three modes 

 of exiftence, or in the language of grammarians, 

 three kinds of verbs. Firft, limply I am, or 

 exift. Secondly, I am acting, or exift in a ftate 

 of activity, as I move. Thirdly, I am fuffering, 

 or xift in a ftate of being acted upon, as I am 

 moved. The when, and the where, as applica- 

 ble to this exiftence, depends on the fucceflive 

 motions of our own or of other bodies ; and 

 on their refpective fituations, as fpoken of Seel. 

 XIV. 2. 5. 



5. Our identity is known by our acquired ha- 

 bits or catenated trains of ideas and mufcular 

 motions ; and perhaps, when we compare infan- 

 cy with old age, in thofe alone can our identity 

 be fuppofed to exift. For what elfe is there of 

 fimilitude between the firft fpeck of living en- 

 tity and the mature man? every deduction of 

 reafoning, every fentiment or paffion, with every 

 fibre of the corporeal part of our fyftem, has 

 been fubject almoft to annual mutation ; while 

 fome catenations alone of our ideas and mufcular 

 actions have continued in part unchanged. 



By the facility, with which we can in our waking 

 hours voluntarily produce certain iucceffive trains 

 of ideas, we know by experience, that we have 

 before reproduced them j that is, we are confcious 



of 



