SECT. XV. 3. CLASSES OF IDEAS. 143 



of a time of our exiftence previous to the prefent 

 time ; that is, of our identity now and heretofore. 

 It is thefe habits of action, thefe catenations of 

 ideas and mufcular motions, which begin with life, 

 and only terminate with it ; and which we can in 

 fome meafure deliver to ourpoflerity j as explained 

 in Sea. XXXIX. 



6. When the progreflive motions of external 

 bodies make a part of our prefent catenation of ideas, 

 we attend to the lapfe of time ; which appears the 

 longer, the more frequently we thus attend to it ; 

 as when we expect fomething at a certain hour, 

 which much interefts us, whether it be an agreeable 

 or difagreeable event ; or when we count the paffing 

 feconds on a ftop-watch. 



When an idea of our own perfon, or a reflex 

 idea of our pleafures and pains, defires and a- 

 verfions, makes a part of this catenation, it is 

 termed confcioufnefs ; and if this idea of con- 

 fcioufnefs makes a part of a catenation, which 

 we excite by recollection, and know by the fa- 

 cility with which we excite it, that we have be- 

 fore experienced it, it is called identity, as ex- 

 plained above. 



7. In refpecl: to freewill, it is certain, that we 

 cannot will to think of a new train of ideas, with- 

 out previoufly thinking of the firft link of it ; as I 

 cannot will to think of a black fwan, without pre- 

 vioufly thinking of a black fwan. But if I now 

 think of a tail, I can voluntary recollecl all animals 

 which have tails ; my will is fo far free, that I can 

 purfue the ideas linked to this idea of tail, as far 

 as my knowledge of the fubjecl: extends ; but to 

 will without motive is to will without defire or 

 averfion ; which is as abfurd as to feel without 

 pleafure or pain : they are both folecifms in the 



terms 



