Sketch of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness 327 



from the standpoint of bio-chemistry, and physiology, and 

 also from that of philosophy in the traditional sense, that 

 demonstration is not only far away, but is attainable, if at 

 all, only by surmounting very formidable difficulties. So I 

 reassure the dubious reader that all I am claiming is that 

 my two propositions about the nature of consciousness to- 

 gether constitute a legitimate scientific hypothesis. 



Personality and Elementary Chemical Substances 



With both the physico-chemical aspect and the psychical 

 aspect of our hypothesis now before us more fully and 

 sharply than they have been hitherto we will examine an ob- 

 jection to it which I apprehend will be the most serious the 

 hypothesis will meet; namely that to the proposition that 

 each individual organism has the value in a chemical sense 

 of an elementary substance. And since this objection will 

 probably be more intolerant and stubborn from the side of 

 physics and chemistry than from that of natural history and 

 psychology I will adjust my remarks with reference to tke 

 opposition as thus anticipated. 



The considerations I am going to present might have been, 

 in strict expository coherence, presented as a part of my 

 discussion of the uniqueness of the individual consciousness 

 as marked by its necessary privacy and its difference from 

 all other individual consciousness. What we are now to 

 emphasize is the fundamentally of objective as contrasted 

 with subjective personality of such highly developed animals 

 as song birds, domesticable animals, and civilized man. 



A complete definition of "personality" is not obligatory 

 for our purpose. Only this much need be said about the 

 meaning we shall give the word: First, we deny the right 

 claimed by some authors to make personality purely psy- 

 chical, or spiritual a thing of the "inner," or "deeper" 

 self; "Self" that is, in a thorough-going subjectivistic sense. 



