A UNIVERSE OF MIND-STUFF 



world of which I am conscious exists only as an 

 organized series of changes in my consciousness, 

 Clifford introduces a very interesting and sug- 

 gestive distinction between the objective and 

 the ejective elements in cognition. Our infer- 

 ences concerning the material world are all in- 

 ferences concerning either some actual or some 

 potential states of consciousness. When I de- 

 scribe the moon at which I am looking, I am 

 describing merely a plexus of optical sensations 

 with sundry revived states of mind linked by 

 various laws of association with the optical sen- 

 sations. When I say that the moon existed be- 

 fore I was born, I only mean that if I had been 

 alive a century ago and stood here and looked 

 up as I am now doing, I should have had a 

 similar plexus of optical sensations and revived 

 states of mind to describe. Obviously there is 

 nothing else which I can mean ; in any state- 

 ment which I may make concerning the world 

 of matter, I can refer only to things which either 

 are, or may be, or might have been, objects ii? 

 my consciousness. But it is quite otherwise 

 when I make statements regarding the existence 

 of minds other than my own. " When I come 

 to the conclusion," says Clifford, " that you are 

 conscious, and that there are objects in your 

 consciousness similar to those in mine, I am 

 not inferring any actual or possible feelings of 

 my own, but your feelings, which are not, and 

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