23 



]7rhate comjjen sat ions. Your conduct car? ics with it an internal evidence 

 beyond all the legal 'proofs of a court of justice.'''' 



Peace hud h;udly been concluded belbre the Frencli were accused of 

 %'iolatious of the treaty, lu 17(34, a sl()oi>ot-war carried intelligence to 

 Enghind thattliey had a very fonnidnble naval force at Newfoundland ; 

 that they intended to erect strong ibrtifications on St. Peter's; and that 

 the English commodore on the station was without force sufficient to 

 prevent the consummation of their plans. The party opposed to the 

 ministry ])ronouRccxi a war with France to be inevitnble, unl(\ss the 

 British government were disposed to surrender both Newtbundlimd and 

 Canada. The alarm — which illustrates the spirit of the time, and the 

 sensibility of the English people — proved to be without cause, since the 

 French governor gave assurances that nothing had been or would be 

 done ( ontrarj'- to the letter of the treaty; that he had but a single small 

 cannon mounted, without a platform, designed merely to answer signals 

 to their fishermen in foggy weather ; that no buildings or works had 

 been erected ; and that his guard consisted of only forty-seven men. 

 It appeared, however, that the French navnl force was considerable, 

 oon-sisting of one ship of fift}^ guns, another of twenty-six guns, and 

 others of smaller rates. 



Rem;u"king tliat the French employed at Newfoundland two hundred 

 and fifty-nine vessels in 17GS, and about the same number five j'^ears 

 later, we come to the war of our own Revolution. To induce France to aid 

 us in the struggle, our envoys were authorized, in 1776, to stipulate that 

 all tlie trade between the United States and the French West Indies 

 should be carried on cither in French or American vessels: and lliey 

 v/ere specially instructed to assure his Most Christian Majesty, that if, 

 by their joint eHbrts, the British should be excluded from any share in 

 tlie cod-fisheries of America by the reduction of the islands of New- 

 (^)undland and Cape Brc^ton, and ships-of-war should be furnished, at 

 tljc expense of the United States, to reduce Nova Scotia, the fisheries 

 should be enjoyed e(|ually l)etween them, to tlie exclu>:''"i of all 

 other nations ; and that one-half of Newfoundland should l^elong to 

 France, and the other half, with Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, to the 

 United States. 



We may smile at — we can hardlv commend — ourfatlun-s for claiming 

 so large a share as this notabh^ scljcme devised; but the spirit which 

 conceived and was prepared to execute so grand an enterprise, addi- 

 tional to the main purposes of their strife with the mother country, is 

 to be placed in strong contrast with the indiffiin-ence manifested now 

 about preserving our rights in the domains which they thus designed to 

 coruiuer. 



In 1778, the project was renewed, in tin- instruclions to Franklin, 

 he was directed to urg(5 nj)f)n the French c(»urt the certainty of ruining 

 ihe British fisheries on the Banks of Newfoiuidland, and conseo I'Mitly 

 the British marine, by reducing Haliliix and (Quebec. Acc( iT-p-^-'yi'ig 

 his instructions was a plan f()r capluiing these places, in which the 

 benefits of their aciiuisitiotj to France and the United Stales were dis- 

 tinctly pointed <uit. They W(!re of imj)ortance to France, it was said, 

 because "the fishrry of Newfi)undland is justly considered the l)asis of a 

 good marine;" and because "the posscssidu (;!" these two places neces- 



