MENTAL LIFE OF APES AND MONKEYS = 277 
“Tf we allow reason to the human species in general, and yet 
restrict it to that species, it must be by identifying the term 
reason arbitrarily with a certain grade in the development 
of analysis. It would be true to say that abstract or ex- 
plicitly general reasoning emerges in the level of intelligence 
under consideration, but we have seen that abstractness 
is only one side of generality, and that the generality of 
human as opposed to animal reasoning is once more primarily 
a matter of explicitness. At bottom the function of mind 
in this as in the lower stages is to organize life by the correla- 
tion of experiences. As in every stage of mental growth 
what is new is that the work of the mind becomes on the 
one hand more explicit or articulate, on the other, more 
comprehensive in scope.” 
Wasmann’s position is typical of the attitude which 
formerly characterized to a greater extent than happily is 
the case now the relation of theology to science. It is theaim 
of science to explain phenomena in terms of natural laws. 
Theology, on the other hand, has always been interested in 
finding things which cannot be so explained, and in thus 
compelling us to take refuge in some sort of supernatural 
intervention. Gaps, barriers, discontinuities, mysterious 
and inexplicable phenomena have always afforded her, 
therefore, a peculiar satisfaction; but one by one they have 
been obliterated or resolved, and there can be little doubt, I 
believe, that the question of the continuous evolution of the 
human mind will go the way of the others. 
While there is little to indicate that the apes are able to 
reason in an abstract way, it is obviously absurd to attempt 
to account for such behavior as we have described on the 
basis of blind sensori-motor association. It is not going too 
far, I think, to say that there is good evidence in the apes and 
monkeys for the existence of ideas and for a certain power 
