278 MENTAL LIFE OF APES AND MONKEYS 
of grasping relations. A monkey which uses a stool to 
enable him to reach an object, and which removes an obstacle 
from his chain so that he may get a piece of food can scarcely 
be said to be devoid of a certain power of representation. 
Many features of the behavior of apes and monkeys mark 
these animals as belonging to a distinctly higher psychic 
level than cats and dogs. It is not likely that a cat or a dog, 
with all due allowance for its physical disabilities, would 
employ a tool with which to pull in a bit of food, much less 
use a stick in order to get the tool for this purpose. The 
monkey looks on the tool as a means to an end, and accord- 
ingly goes after it. There is less evidence that objects have 
such a meaning to cats and dogs. These animals might try 
in various ways to reach food lying on a table; if a chair or 
box were at hand they would doubtless mount upon it in 
order to get the food. But even after seeing chairs and 
boxes pulled around by human beings any number of times 
it probably would not occur to one of these creatures to pull 
the chair or box into position for its own use. 
The mind of the lower mammals is pretty closely chained to 
its various objects of perception. It may have ideas, but 
they are lacking in “articulateness.” But the monkey 
seems to be gifted with a certain degree of initiative; things 
occur to him, and he apparently thinks about things in the 
effort to attain a particular result. He shows a decided 
approach to ourselves in many little ways of doing things. 
He is not interested merely in the gratification of his appe- 
tites; he is actuated by a sort of intellectual curiosity in re- 
gard to objects. Miss Romanes’ monkey would almost always 
set an orange to spinning before eating it just for the fun 
of seeing it go; he took great delight in breaking objects to 
pieces and in overturning things; he removed a bell handle 
from the mantel piece which involved unscrewing three 
