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E. L. THORNDIKE. 



Of one thing I am sure, and that is that it is worth while to 

 state the question and how to solve it, for although the point of 

 view involved is far removed from that of our leading psycholo- 

 o-ists to-day, it cannot long remain so. I am sorry that I can- 

 not pretend to give a final decision. 



The view seems preposterous because, if an animal has sense- 

 impressions when his brain is excited by currents starting in the 

 end-organs, it seems incredible that he should not be conscious 

 in imagination and memory by having similar excitations caused 

 from within. We are accustomed to think of memory as the 

 companion of sensation. But, after all, it is a question of fact 

 whether the connections in the cat-brain include connections be- 

 tween present sensation-neuroses and past sensation-neuroses. 

 The only connections may be those between the former and im- 

 pulse-neuroses, and there is no authoritative reason why we 

 should suppose any others unless they are demonstrated by the 

 cat's behavior. This is just the point at issue. Such evidence 

 as the phenomena of animals' dreams does not at all prove the 

 presence of memory or imagination. A dog may very well 

 growl in his sleep without any idea of a hostile dog. The im- 

 pulse to growl may be caused by chance excitement of its own 

 neurosis without any sensation-neurosis being concerned. Acts of 

 recognition may have no feelings of recognition going with or 

 causing them. A sense-impression of me gets associated in my 

 dog's mind with the impulses to jump on me, lick my hand, 

 wag his tail, etc. If, after a year, the connection between the 

 two has lasted, he will surely jump on me, lick my hand and 

 wag his tail, though he has not and never had any representa- 

 tion of me. 



The only logical way to go at this question and settle it 

 is, I think, to find some association the formation of which re- 

 quires the presence of images, of ideas. You have to give an 

 animal a chance to associate sense-impression A with sense- 

 impression B and then to associate B with some act C so that 

 the presence of B in the mind will lead to the performance of 

 C. Presumably the representation of B, if present, will lead to 

 C just as the sense-impression B did. Now, if the chance to 

 associate B with A has been improved, you ought-, when the 



