I04 E. L. THORNDIKE. 



is not argument, but accurate accounts of the mental fact and 

 of the brain-process. But I do wish to say to the parallelist, 

 what has not to my knowledge been said, that if he presupposes, 

 to account for this fact, a ' physical analogue of the hedonic 

 consciousness,' it is his bounden duty to first show how any 

 motion in any neuron or group of neurons in the nervous system 

 can possess this power of stamping in any current which causes 

 it. For no one would, from our present knowledge of the brain, 

 judge a priori that any motion in any part of it could be con- 

 ceived which should be thus regnant over all the others. And 

 next he must show the possibility of the current which repre- 

 sents the association being the excitant of this regnant motion 

 in a manner direct enough for the purpose. 



I wish also to say that whoever thinks that, going along with 

 the current which parallels the association, there is an accompany- 

 ing minor current, which parallels the pleasure and which stamps 

 in the first current when present with it, flies directly in the 

 face of the facts. There ts no pleasure along with the associa- 

 tion. The -pleasure does 7iot come until after the association is 

 done and gone. It is caused by no such minor current, but by 

 the excitation of peripheral sense-organs when freedom from 

 confinement is realized or food is secured. Of course, the no- 

 tion of such a secondary sub-current is mythology, any way. 



To the interactionist I would say : " Do not any more repeat 

 in tiresome fashion that consciousness does alter movement, but 

 get to work and show when, where, in what forms and to what 

 degrees it does so. Then, even if it turns out to have been a 

 physical parallel that did the work, you will, at least, have the 

 credit of attaining the best knowledge about the results and 

 their conditions, even though you misnamed the factor.'' 



Besides this contribution to general psychology, I think we 

 may safely offer one to pedagogical science. At least some of 

 our results possess considerable pedagogical interest. The fun- 

 damental form of intellection, the association-process in animals, 

 is one, we decided, which requires the personal experience of 

 the animal in all its elements. The association cannot be taught 

 by puttmg the animal through it or giving it a chance to imitate. 

 Now every observant teacher realizes how often the cleverest 



