A T HENS. 



19 



i. to plunder. But while they were busied in this oc- 



? * cupation, the Persians rallied, surprised them in their 



turn, and drove them out of the town. The confe- 

 derates now made a precipitate retreat to the coast, 

 but even this did not preserve them from Persian ven- 

 v geance. The army of the great king came up with 



them at Ephesus, and after an obstinate engagement, 

 totally defeated them. In consequence of this dis- 

 aster, dissensions arose among the confederates, and 

 the Athenians returned home, abandoning the cause 

 of their unfort*iate allies. Such was the issue of 

 their first contest with the Persian arms, which certain- 

 ly did not prognosticate that splendid success, with 

 which their enterprises were afterwards crowned. 



This affair directed the eyes of the Persian monarch 

 towards Greece, both as an object of resentment and 

 of ambition. His first step was to send round heralds 

 to the different states, demanding earth and water, the 

 usual tokens of submission. All, overawed by the 

 power of Persia, complied, excepting Athens and 

 Lacedemon. These two cities, with a barbarous pa- 

 triotism, threw the ambassadors into wells, and casting 

 earth upon them, declared, that they had now obtain- 

 ed their demand. 



Darius, who then reigned in Persia, proceeded now 

 to more formidable measures. Mardonius was first 

 sent with a large army to cross the Hellespont, 

 and attack the northern districts ; but a violent 

 storm having dispersed his fleet, he returned without 

 effecting any thing of importance. A new plan was 

 then arranged. An immense fleet and army having 

 been assembled, it was determined to transport them 

 from the shore of the Lesser Asia, and to land them, 

 first in the island of Eubcea ; after having subdued 

 which, and signally punished the Erctrians, they might 

 pass over into Attica. Mardonius, who had been at. 

 least unfortunate, was superseded, and the command 

 given to Datis and Artapherncs ; the one distinguish- 

 ed by long experience in war< the other by his noble 

 birth. They were accompanied by Hippias, the ex- 

 pelled tyrant of Athens, who had hoped, from the 

 sympathy and ambition of the Persian monarch, to 

 obtain what he could not expect from the consent of 

 fellow citizens, or the interference of the other 

 states. The armament sailed first to Eubcea, took 

 and plundered Eretria, and from thence prepared to 

 pass over into Attica. 

 A.C.490. The Athenians, while so great a storm was impend- 

 ing, were not inattentive to the means of security. 

 Besides collecting all their own military force, they 

 applied for aid to the other states of Greece, and par- 

 ticularly to the Lacedemonians. That slow and cau- 

 tious people, either from superstition or timidity, de- 

 clared that their religion rendered it unlawful for them 

 to dispatch an army before the time of full moon. The 

 other states were still more backward. The Plateans 

 alone, who lay under peculiar obligations to the Athe- 

 nians, joined them with 1000 men. 

 Miltiades. Miftiades was at this time the most eminent man 

 in Athens. He was sprung from one of the most 

 distinguished families in the city. Having conduct- 

 ed a colony to the Chersonese, where he reigned 

 with almost absolute power, he had an opportunity, 

 when Darius ltd his expedition against the Scythians, 

 of observing the materials and disposition of the Persian 



4 . 



armies. The Athenian system of military command Athene, 

 seems then to have been singularly cumbersome and v 



inconvenient. Ten generals were appointed, who com- 

 manded in rotation, each for a single day ; while one 

 of the archons, named the Polemarch, had the su- 

 preme decision in all doubtful questions. Miltiades, 

 however, in this crisis of public danger, was raised by 

 his own talents, and the wisdom of his colleagues, to 

 the chief direction of affairs. Some urged the pro- 

 priety of'a protracted, and merely defensive system of 

 warfare, until the torrent should have spent its force, 

 and the strength of Greece had time to be collected. 

 But Miltiades, addressing himself to Callimachus, 

 who was then Polemarch, after representing the tran- 

 scendent importance of this decision, which would 

 either obliterate the name of Athens, or raise her to 

 the first rank among Grecian states, gave his opinion 

 decidedly in favour of an immediate engagement. 

 The whole Athenian people were now ardent and 

 united in this glorious cause ; but a delay might breed 

 divisions, and cause this spirit to evaporate. Room 

 would be left for Persian influence and Persian gold, 

 the fatal effects of which had been recently experienced 

 in the fall of Eretria. Callimachus, satisfied with 

 these arguments, acceded to the advice of Miltiades. 

 Aristides, who was one of the ten generals, gave, on 

 this occasion, the first example of that virtuous disin- 

 terestedness which marked his character, by resign- 

 ing, on his day, the command to Miltiades. This ex- 

 ample was followed by the rest. Miltiades, however, 

 with a prudent moderation, declined fighting till his 

 own day arrived. He drew up his army in a man- B itilo of 

 ner which enabled him to call forth all its ener- Marathon, 

 gies, while it rendered unavailing those of the ene- 

 my. The strength of the latter consisted in cavalry 

 and bowmen ; accustomed to fight at a distance, and 

 to advance and retreat alternately, over the vast plains 

 of Asia. The force of the Grecian armies, on the 

 contrary, consisted almost entirely in their heavy in- 

 fantry, armed with pikes, and ranged in a deep pha- 

 lanx. Miltiades, who knew the strength and valour 

 of this body, was satisfied, that when it came to close 

 combat, nothing in the Persian army could resist its 

 charge. To diminish the effect of superior numbers, 

 he chose a spot which was confined on one side by a 

 mountain, and on the other by a morass. He placed 

 his heavy armed foot, in which all his confidence rest- 

 ed, (though, including the Plateans, it amounted only 

 to 10,000 men,) on each of the wings, leaving the 

 centre to be occupied by light armed troops, and even 

 by slaves, a number of whom had been armed on this 

 emergency. These were more numerous, but from 

 their inferiority in discipline, Miltiades fully calculated 

 on their giving way in the first instance. The Per- 

 sians, on the other hand, ranged their cavalry and 

 light troops in the wings, and placed in the centre 

 the forces of Persia Proper, which alone were fitted 

 to engage in clcse combat. Miltiades, in order to 

 encumber the movements of the enemy's cavalry, had 

 caused trees to be felled, and laid across the field. 

 The Persian wings, however, advancing as well as 

 these obstacles would permit, poured upon the Greeks 

 a shower of missile weapons of eveiy description. 

 The Athenians, agreeably to the order of Miltiades, 

 did not return a single javelin, hut raising a shout,. 



