ATHENS. 



23 



At'.tllS. 



Retreat of 

 Xerxes. 



Battle of 



Ives on the rock of Psyttaleia, to cut off such 

 of their enemies as might seek shelter there, were 

 themselves surrounded and cut to pieces. 



Thus terminated this battle, so memorable in the 

 annals of Greece and of mankind. Xerxes, from the 

 shore, whjM he had seated himself, beheld this mighty 

 disaster, which levelled his towering hopes in the 

 dust. Themistocles at first entertained a plan of de- 

 taching a squadron to occupy the Hellespont, and 

 t the return of the Persians. But Aristides 

 prudently observed, that their object was far less to 

 destroy this armament, than finally to rid Greece of 

 it ; and that it was dangerous to reduce such a host 

 to despair. Themistocles then adopting an opposite 

 policy, sent by his former channel an intimation to 

 Xerxes, that such a design was entertained by the 

 Greeks, exhorting him to lose no time in effecting 

 his retreat. Xerxes, in whom the" impression of fear 

 was then as predominant as that of false confidence 

 had before been, made no hesitation in taking the ad- 

 vice ; and, with the great mass of his army, made a 

 tumultuous retreat to the Hellespont. He left Mar- 

 donius, however, with three hundred thousand men ; 

 a number which included perhaps all the real strength 

 of that formidable army, freed from its useless incum- 

 brances. 



The Athenians had now returned to their city; 

 and Mardonius hoping to gain them over by the 

 dread of a second time iosid^' it, sent Alexander, king 

 of Macedon, to urge then to submit. The Athe- 

 nians firmly rejected his proposal; but this magnani- 

 mity did not meet with its proper return on the part 

 of the peloponnesians. They again resolved to con- 

 fine themselves to the defence of their own peninsula, 

 by drawing a wall across the isthmus. The conse- 

 quence was, that Athens was a second time taken 

 and plundered. The remonstrances of the Athe- 

 nians, however, and perhaps the dread of their deser- 

 tion, at length recalled Sparta to more honourable 

 sentiments. She collected her own force and that of 

 her allies, marched it beyond the isthmus, and joined 

 the Athenians. The combined armies, next summer, 

 fought the battle of Plataea, in which, though the 

 Lacedemonians took the leading part, yet the ser- 

 o{ Athens were considerable. She engaged 

 those Greeks, a numerous body, who, to the shame 

 of their country, fought on the 6ide of its enemies. 

 The signal services they had rendered to the common 

 cause, secur d them the command of the left wing, 

 which had before been uniformly conferred on the 

 Tegeans. 



The Athenians distinguished themselves still more 

 in an action which was fought on the same day, near 

 the promontory of Mycale, in Ionia. The wrecks of 

 the Persian fleet having taken refuge on the coasts of 

 Asia Minor, the Greeks followed >:hem. Under 

 these circumstances, the Ionian* conceiving this a fa- 

 vourable opportunity for throwing off the Persian 

 yoke, applied to them for aid. They did not decline 

 the invitation, but landed, and joining their forces to 

 those of the Ionians, gave battle to the Persians, who 

 had assembled an army vastly superior. After an 

 ite combat, the Persians were completely routed. 

 The Spartans pursued those who fled towards the 

 passes of the mountains, while the Athenians stormed 



Athens. 



their camp. In consequence of this victory, Ionia 



was freed, and a large portion of the Asiatic coast v~~ / 



rescued from the hands of the enemy. 



The Athenians followed up their victory, by be- 

 sieging Sestos, a large town of Thrace, commanding 

 the straits of the Hellespont, which they took after 

 a long siege. 



The first care of the Athenians, after returning to A. C. 478. 

 their city, was to rebuild their walls, and to give Athens re- 

 them additional strength and solidity. This measure built, con- 

 was opposed by the .Lacedemonians, under pretence tr r r .y to * 

 of its being contrary to the interest of Greece that .i, e g Dar . 

 there should be strong places beyond the isthmus. tan ^. 

 Their real motive, however, was suspected to be an 

 aversion to the rising greatness of the Athenians. 

 Themistocles conducted himself here with great art. 

 He got himself appointed ambassador to Sparta ; and 

 before setting out, he caused all the citizens, of every 

 age and sex, to apply themselves to the task of build- 

 ing the walls, making use of any materials which 

 were within their reach. Fragments of houses, tem- 

 ples, and other buildings, were accordingly employed, 

 producing a grotesque appearance, which remained 

 to the days of Plutarch. He then set out for Sparta, 

 but on various pretences declined entering on his 

 commission, till he had received intelligence that the 

 work which he had set on foot was nearly completed. 

 He then went boldly to the Lacedemonian senate, 

 declared what had been done, and justified it not only 

 by the natural fight of the Athenians to provide for 

 their own defence, but by the advantage of opposing 

 such an obstacle to the progress of the barbarians. 

 The Lacedemonians, sensible of the justice of this ar- 

 gument, and seeing that remonstrance would now 

 avail nothing, were fain to acquiesce. 



Themistocles, ever studious of the maritime great- 

 ness of Athens, caused a new and more commodious 

 harbour to be built at Piraeus, which in process of 

 time was joined to the city by a very thick wall, five 

 miles in length. 



The confederate fleets continued to pursue their 

 advantages. They scoured the shores of Asia Mi- 

 nor, and the iEgean, drove out the Persian garrisons, 

 and enriched themselves by plunder. They also, 

 after an obstinate defence, stormed and took Byzan- 

 tium. 



The Lacedemonians had hitherto, by common con- A. C. 476. 

 sent, held the chief command, both by land and sea. 

 The recent events, however, had thrown a lustre 

 around Athens, of which no other state could now 

 boast. They had reaped the chief glory both- in the 

 battles of Marathon and Salamis ; they had suffered 

 most ; had always stood forward generously in 

 the common cause ; while Sparta had too often ob- 

 served a cold and selfish policy. These favourable 

 impressions were heightened by the contrast of the 

 consummate justice and good conduct of her com- 

 manders, Aristides and Cimon, with the haughtiness 

 and insolence of Pausanias the Spartan king. Moved 

 by these different considerations, the allies unani- 

 mously determined to transfer the chief command at 

 sea, now much more important than land, to the 

 Athenians. The Lacedemonians wisely forbore an 

 opposition, which they knew would be vain : and as 

 a common treasury was necessary for the prosecution 



