60 



A T T E N T I O N. 



Attention. us in rapid succession, make but a fleeting impression 

 v v ' upon the mind, and efface each other from our recol- 

 lection. 



It is an important question in the subject of atten- 

 tion, whether we have the power of attending to 

 more than one thing at the same instant ; or, in other 

 words, whether we can attend at one and the tame 

 instant to objects which we can attend to sepa- 

 rately. This qie stion has usually been decided in 

 the negative ; it being supposed to be impossible that 

 the mind can bend its tlioughts upon more than pne 

 thing at the same time. It is a consequence of this 

 doctrine, that in a concert of music, instead of attend- 

 ing to the different parts of the performance all at 

 once, so as to feel the full effect of the harmony ; the 

 mind must constantly vary its attention from one part 

 of the music to another, although its operations are 

 so rapid as to give us no perception of an interval of 

 time. " The same doctrine," says Mr Stewart, 

 leads to some curious conclusions with respect to 

 vision. Suppose the eye to be fixed in a particular 

 position, and the picture of an object to be painted 

 on the retina ; Does the mind perceive the complete 

 figure of the object at once, or is this perception the 

 result of the vai ious perceptions we have of the dif- 

 ferent points in the outline ? With respect to this 

 question, the principles already stated lead me to con- 

 clude, that the mind does at one and the same time 

 perceive every point in the outline of the object, (pro- 

 vided the wlole of it be painted on the retina at the 

 same instant,) for perception, like consciousness, is an 

 involuntary operation. As no two points, however, 

 of the outline are in the same direction, every point 

 by itself constitutes just as distinct an object of at- 

 tention to the mind, as if it were separatee! by an in- 

 terval of empty space from all the rest. If the doc- 

 trine, therefore, formerly stated be just, it is impossi- 

 ble lor the mind to attend to more than one of these 

 points at once ; and as the perception of the figure of 

 the object, implies a knowledge of the relative situa- 

 tion of the different points with respect to each other, 

 we must conclude, that the perception of figure by 

 the eye, is the result of a number of different acts of 

 attention. These acts of attention, however, are per- 

 formed with such rapidity, that the effect, with re- 

 spect to us, is the same as if perception were instan- 

 taneous. 



" In farther confirmation of this reasoning, it may 

 be remarked, that if the perception of visible figure 

 were an immediate consequence of the picture on the 

 retina, we should have at the first glance as distinct 

 an idea of a figure of a thousand sides, as of a tri- 

 angle or a square. The truth is, that when the figure 

 is very simple, the process of the mind is so rapid, 

 that the perception seems to be instantaneous ; but 

 when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain num- 

 ber, the interval of time necessary for these different 

 acts of attention becomes perceptible. It may per- 

 haps be asked, what I mean by a. point in the outline 

 of a figure, and what it is that constitutes this point 

 one object of attention ? The answer, I apprehend, is, 

 that this point is the Ibkhk visibile. If the point be 

 less, we cannot perceive it : if it be greater, it is not 

 at all seen in one direction." Elements of the Phi- 

 losophy oj'-the Human Mind, c. 2. 



This doctrine, however, that the mind is incapable Attention, 

 of attending to more than a single object, at one and 

 the m)( instant ot time, has been controverted by 

 various able philosophers, wli it to be found- 



ed on a false analogy supposed to exist between the 

 properties of body and those ot mind. Material space, 

 it is well known, must be completely occupied by a 

 single body, to the exclusion of every other from that 

 portion of it which the body fills ; but what reason 

 have we to ascribe such a quality as this to mind ? 

 Where is the analogy between the understanding and 

 external space ; or between a mere notion of the in- 

 tellect, and an impenetrable piece of matter ? On the 

 contrary, there seems a kind of necessity, in certain 

 cases, for admitting that the mind can attend at the 

 same moment to objects which may also be made se- 

 parate objects of attention, otherwise it does not ap- 

 pear how the relations and points of comparison be- 

 tween those objects can be satisfactorily understood. 

 How, for example, can we discern the harmony be- 

 tween two musical notes, unless both are present to 

 the mind together ? Or how can we draw a conclu- 

 sion from a comparison of two or more connected 

 truths, unless we contemplate these truths in the mind 

 at one and the same moment ? Every syllogism is 

 formed, by comparing together two propositions, cal- 

 led the major and the minor ; and it seems necessary, 

 before we can form a legitimate inference, that these 

 two propositions should, at the same instant, be ob- 

 jects of our attention. 



" Many single words," says Dr Gregory, " for 

 example prepositions, and most sentences, denote some 

 kiud of relation ; but we cannot, I think, conceive a 

 relation, without thinking at once of the things (two 

 or more) that are related, as well as of the relation 

 (both in its generic and in its specific nature) that sub- 

 sists between them.' This author is of opinion, that, 

 with respect to the moods and other inflections ofverbs, 

 there cannot be a doubt that they are employed to 

 denote combinations of simultaneous thoughts, no one 

 of which can reasonably be said to occur to the person 

 speaking, or to be apprehended by the person hear- 

 ing, before the rest : and that all nouns, even proper 

 names, denote a congeries of circumstances, or mass 

 (not a train) of thoughts, which are conceived at 

 once, and cannot be separated and considered in suc- 

 cession, but by a very laborious effort. See Theory 

 of the Moods of' Verbs, Edin. Phil. Trans, vol. ii. 



Various remarkable examples are upon record of 

 the great power of undivided attention possessed by 

 certain individuals, and of the capacity of apparently 

 attending at the same moment to more than one im- 

 portant and interesting concern. Fontenelle relates 

 of the celebrated mathematician Montmort, that he 

 could command his attention at pleasure, insomuch, 

 that in the same chamber where he was at work on 

 the most complicated problems, his chUdren might be 

 as noisy as they pleased, or might dance and play 

 upon the harpsichord. The famous chess-player Phi- 

 Udor, it is well known, could direct three games of 

 chess at the same instant, of one ot which only he re- 

 quired ocular inspection, the moves of the other two 

 being merely announced to him by an assistant. 

 And it is recorded of Julius Caesar, that while he wa 

 writing a dispatch, he could at the same moment die- 



