316 



BATTLE. 



Battle, tacking them, they were dispersed. The Egyptian 

 *- "v ' battalions, however, pressed forward, and drove the 

 Persian lines up to their machines, but their flanks 

 and rear being unprotected, they were exposed to 

 the attacks of the victorious wings of the Persian 

 army, and finally compelled to surrender, which ter- 

 minated the battle. 



The account of this battle is no where to be found, 

 but in Xenophon's Ci/ra/hcdia, which is a philosophi- 

 cal romance. But it probably bears the same rela- 

 tion to truth, that the incidents narrated in a modern 

 work of that class bear to the real occurrences in 

 life ; and it may contain a faithful description of the 

 Persian method of forming an army for battle in the 

 age of Cyrus, with which Xenophon must have been 

 well acquainted. We therefore discover, that by the 

 Persian order of battle, the cavalry were placed on 

 the flanks, and the infantry drawn up in lines, accord- 

 ing to the nature of the weapons with which they 

 were armed, and the efficacy that was to be expected 

 from them in action. The first line consisting of 

 heavy armed troops, using the short pike and scymi- 

 tar ; the second, light armed, with javelins, which 

 they could project over the first line ; the third, ar- 

 chers, where strong bows could throw the arrow 

 over the two preceding lines ; the fourth, heavy 

 armed, intended as a corps-de-reserve ; and, lastly, 

 their machines and moveable towers, which answered 

 nearly the same purpose as modern batteries. 



The disposition of an army in lines is nearly all 

 that the ancients of that and the previous ages knew 

 of the military art regarding battles and engagements. 

 They possessed little knowledge of the advantage of 

 strong positions either for attack or defence ; ot an- 

 noying an enemy by cutting off his supplies, or of 

 forcing him to battle under unfavourable circum- 

 stances; of securing their flanks by marshes, rivers, 

 or mountains ; or of seizing passes and defiles, by 

 which a small army has been often enabled to resist a 

 greatly superior force. 

 Bittle of The art of war was brought to considerable per- 



Marathon. fection by the Greeks, whose battles in general were 

 conducted with science and judgment. The Athe- 

 nian army, in the battle of Marathon, was drawn up 

 in such a manner as to embrace all the advantages 

 of local situation, so as to afford a small body every 

 possible chance of success against vastly superior 

 numbers. Miltiades formed his little army at the 

 foot of a mountain, which secured his rear, and by 

 verging towards the sea, also protected his right 

 flank j and on his left, there was a lake or morass. 

 His flanks were farther protected, by the trunks and 

 branches of trees strewed on the ground, through 

 which the Persian cavalry could not penetrate. As 

 the Athenian army consisted of only 10,000 men, 

 Miltiades could not sufficiently extend his front, and at 

 the same time preserve an equal deepness in his line ; he 

 therefore weakened his centre, and strengthened his 

 wings, on which he placed his hopes of success. The 

 enemy bent his principal force against the Athenian 

 centre, which, notwithstanding the efforts of Aristides 

 and Themistocles, was compelled to give ground. 

 But the wings of the Athenian army having broke 

 and dispersed those of the enemy, they attacked the 

 main body of the Persians in flank and in rear, and 



the Grecian spear overcoming all opposition, a total Battle, 

 rout ensued, accompanied by an immense slaughter of 



the barbarians. The judicious disposition of the 

 Athenian army in this battle compensated for the 

 want of numbers ; and being placed, from this cir- 

 cumstance, on an equality with the Persians, it de- 

 rivi d all the advantages that could result from su- 

 perior discipline, skill, and valour. 



The battle of Leuctra, which was fought about Battle of 

 120 years after that of Marathon, affords a fine illus- Leuctrai 

 tration of an able disposition in the field, and exhibits, 

 at the same time, the progress of military knowledge 

 among the Greeks. The Lacedemonian army con- 

 sisted of 24,000 foot and 16,000 horse; and was 

 drawn up in the form of a crescent, with the cavalry 

 in squadrons, in front of the right wing. The The- 

 ban army was only 6000 foot and 4-00 cavalry in all ; 

 but it was commanded by Epaminondas. The The- 

 ban general formed his left wing into a column, fifty 

 deep, composed of heavy armed troops, with the ca- 

 valry posted in front, and the whole was flanked by 

 the Sacred Band under Pelopidas. To guard against 

 being surrounded by the arms of the Spartan crescent, 

 Epaminondas drew up the right wing of his army, in 

 a direction oblique to the Lacedemonian line, and di- 

 verging from it, in proportion to the extension of hb 

 ranks. The action commenced with the onset of the 

 cavalry, and the charge of the sacred band ; which 

 occasioned considerable confusion in the Lacedemo- 

 nian ranks. Epaminondas availed himself of this 

 favourable opportunity, and rapidly forming his co- 

 lumn into a wedge, penetrated the right wing of the 

 enemy, and bore down every thing before him. Vic- 

 tory crowned his efforts ; and to the able disposition 

 of the Theban army we must attribute his success. 

 On his massy column he placed all his hopes, and ju- 

 diciously protecting its flanks, where it was only vul- 

 nerable, by the sacred band on the one hand, and the 

 oblique line on the other, it was irresistible. The 

 oblique line kept the left wing of the enemy in check, 

 and his right was flanked and attacked by the sacred 

 band. Within a few years afterwards, the battle of Battle of 

 Mantinasa was fought by the same general, on the Mantinasa. 

 same principle, and attended by similar success. The 

 discovery of the power of a deep battalion in the 

 form of a wedge, belongs to the genius of Epami- 

 nondas, and it gave him a decided superiority over 

 his antagonists. 



The battle of Chseronea was decided by the power Battle of 

 of the Macedonian phalanx ; and Philip selected a Chaeronea. 

 place which he considered as well adapted for the ope- 

 rations of that body, and altogether disposed his ar- 

 my with great judgment and sagacity. The strength 

 of the Macedonian army was 30,000 foot and 2,000 

 horse. The Greeks were nearly as numerous, but 

 equal in courage and bravery. Philip commanded 

 the right wing, in which the phalanx was stationed, 

 his son Alexander the left, with the Thessalian ca- 

 valry. The Athenian forces were opposed to the 

 Macedonian right, and the Thebans, with the sacred 

 band, to the left. Both armies had their allies in the 

 centre. Alexander charged the Thebans, and cut off 

 the sacred band to a man. The Athenians repelled 

 their opposing divisions, and the Macedonian centre 

 gave way. Elated with their partial success, thc\ 



