318 



BATTLE. 



B.ut'e 



Battle of 

 Pharsalia. 



.man army consisted of forty thousand foot, and 

 ten thousand cavalry. The wIk.Io infantry of the 

 Roman antiy were in one line, closer and deeper than 

 usual; the cavalry upon the two win ;s; and the light 

 armed troops advanced in front at some distance 

 from the mai.i body. Paulas iEmilius command 

 the right wing, Varro the left, and Servilitis Gremi- 

 nus the centre of the army. Hannibal also drew up 

 his army in one line of equal depth, with the Spanish 

 and Gaulish cavalry o;. the left, and the Numidian 

 horse on the right. The light armed troops were 

 stationed in front facing those ol the Romans. Hanno 

 commanded the right wing, Asdrubal the left, and 

 Hannibal the centre of the army, which \va3 com- 

 posed of the Spanish and Gaulish Lgionaries, and 

 advanced forward in such a manner, as that the 

 whole line formed the figure of a crescent, with the 

 convex side towards the Romans. The light armed 

 troops commenced the'battle, and the horse of the 

 left wing of the Carthaginian army 60 furiously 

 charged those of the Roman right, that they gave 

 way and were totally dispersed. The infantry ot the 

 Carthaginian centre were unable to withstand the 

 superior numbers of the Romans, and gave ground. 

 Hannibal had calculated upon this circumstance, and 

 was accordingly prepared to receive the eager Ro- 

 mans by a second line of battalions, which he had 

 drawn from the wings, and were ranged in close or- 

 der. The front of the Carthaginian army now be- 

 came a crescent with the conca-vc side towards the ene- 

 my, who impetuously pressed forward, exposed both 

 his flanks to the assaults of the Carthaginian- wings, 

 and being at the same time attacked in rear by the vic- 

 torious Asdrubal, who had also dispersed the cavalry 

 of the left wing, the Romans were thus encompassed 

 on all sides, and so much compressed, that they had 

 not room to wield their arms, and were put to the 

 sword, to the number of seventy thousand. 



Hannibal's disposition of his army in the battle of 

 Cannae, has been admired by the tacticians of all 

 succeeding ages. But it is evident, that the success 

 of the horse of his left wing gave him a decided su- 

 periority over the Romans, whose only error arose 

 from too keenly pursuing the Carthaginian centre, 

 while their flanks were unprotected, in consequence 

 of the dispersion of their cavalry. 



In the celebrated battle of Pharsalia, the defeat 

 of Pompey's horse gave the victory to Caesar. Pom- 

 pey drew up his army with the veteran soldiers in 

 the centre and on the flanks ; and the less expert be- 

 tween the wings and the main body ; with the whole 

 of his cavalry on the left flank, the right being pro- 

 tected by the river Enipeus. When Caesar observed 

 that his great antagonist had drawn all his cavalry to 

 one point, he conjectured that Pompey intended to 

 turn his right flank, to prevent which, he stationed 

 six cohorts, as a separate body, behind the right 

 wing. Pompey's horse compelled Caesar's to give 

 ground; but when they extended themselves with 

 the view of flanking Cxsar's left wing, the cohorts 

 vigorously attacked, broke, and dispersed them, and 

 then fell upon the rear of Pompey's left wing. 

 Caesar in the mean time brought up his third line, 

 which till then had not engaged, and Pompey's in- 

 fantry being thus assailed on all sides, could no 



r resist, but fled to their camp. Ca:sar owed Bauie. 

 his success, in a great measure in this battle, to the ~ 

 able disposition of his army, especially in forming 

 the cohorts as a corps-de reserve, which repulsed the 

 enemy's cavalry, turned his right flank, and attacked 

 his legions in the rear. 



The Roman manner of drawing up an army for 

 battle may be sufficiently illustrated by the instance 

 of a single legion. The cavalry were stationed on 

 the wings, and the infantry formed on a line with 

 the first cohort ; the second cohort drew up on the 

 left of the first ; the third occupied the centre ; the 

 fourth was next ; and the fifth closed the left flank. 

 In the second line, the sixth cohort drew up behind the 

 first on the right flank, the seventh next, the eighth 

 in the centre, the ninth was next, and the tenth al- 

 ways closed the left wing. In the rear of these two 

 lines were the light infantry, armed with shields, 

 javelins, swords, and missive weapons, and here also 

 the archers and slingers were posted. In the rear of 

 these -three lines the triarii were stationed. They 

 were armed with shields, cuirasses, helmets, greave;, 

 swords, and daggers, loaded javelins, and two missive 

 weapons. They rested on one knee during the ac- 

 tion, that in the event of the preceding lines being 

 defeated they might be fresh when brought up to the 

 charge. In the beginning of the conflict, the first, 

 second, and fourth lines, remained immoveable, and 

 the light armed troops advanced in front of the line 

 and attacked the enemy. If they were successful, 

 they pursued him; but if they were repulsed, they 

 retired behind the heavy armed infantry, which now 

 sustained the action, at first, with their missive wea- 

 pons, and then, sword in hand. If the enemy fled, he 

 was pursued by the light armed troops and cavalry ; 

 but if the contrary happened, and the legion was 

 worsted, it endeavoured to preserve its o.rder in the 

 retreat. A Roman legion was an army complete in 

 all its parts, and contained every thing requisite for 

 war within itself. A free space for his arms and 

 motions was allowed to the soldier, and by the inter- 

 vals the exhausted ranks could be easily supplied 

 with reinforcements. The Greeks and Macedonians 

 formed their system of tactics on very different prin- 

 ciples; for the strength ot the phalanx depended up- 

 on sixteen ranks of long pike* wedged together in 

 the closest array. " But it was soon discovered, 

 says Gibbon, " by reflection as well as by the event, 

 that the strength of the phalanx was unable to con- 

 tend with the activity r of the legion." 



The people of antiquity were extremely addicted 

 to superstitious rites, which preceded every great un- 

 dertaking ; and war, the most momentous business of 

 mankind, called forth all their prejudices in favour of 

 divination and sacrifices. Oracles and augurs were 

 consulted, and lucky or unlucky days were consider- 

 ed, previous to entering into a war, or engaging in 

 battle. This custom of soliciting the assistance of 

 the gods, universally prevailed amongst the Egyptian, 

 Assyrian, Grecian, and Roman nations. Tiie Eace- 

 demonians had no share in the glorious battle of Ma- 

 rathon, because, by a ridiculous superstition, they 

 were prevented from marching before the day of full 

 moon. But so much were that people under the in- 

 fluence of divination, that, at the battle of Plataea, 



