BATTLE. 



349 



Battle, they tamely remained in tlieir ranks while the Per- 



1 V ' sians assaulted them, because their offer of sacrifice 



did not seem to be acceptable to the gods. Pausa- 

 nias, the Spartan general, by the fervency of his 

 prayers, obtained at last the favour of heaven ; and 

 the sacrifices appearing propitious, gave the signal 

 for battle, when his army fell upon the Persians with 

 such resolution that they were totally defeated. 

 Signals for The signals for battle among the Greeks were of 

 tattle, two kinds, either visible or auricular. The most an- 



cient were lighted torches, thrown from both armies 

 by the priets of Mars, whose persons were held in- 

 violable. The elevation of their ensigns, or flags, 

 or a purple mantle raised upon the top of a spear, 

 were also signals for battle. But these being laid 

 aside, the sound of the shell and the trumpet indica- 

 ted the orders of the general, and animated the souls 

 of the brave. The Greeks then rushed into battle 

 with a loud shout, to encourage themselves, and inti- 

 midate their enemies. 



Amongst the Romans, signals were distinguished 

 by the terms vocal, semivocal, and mute. Vocal 

 signals were the words given for the engagement by 

 the general ; semivocal, by the sound of the trumpet, 

 cornet, or buccina, which directed the army whether 

 to halt or advance, to pursue the enemy or to retreat. 

 Mute signals, were the eagles, dragons, standards, 

 &c. which the soldiers followed wherever they mo- 

 ved. The troops were accustomed to understand 

 and to obey all these signals, whether in their quar- 

 ters, or on marches, in camps, or in battles. It was 

 also customary for bodies of troops, at a distance 

 from each other, to convey intelligence by fires in the 

 night, or by smoke in the day. 



Before joining battle, it was the practice of the 

 generals to address their armies ; and the pages of the 

 ancient historians are full of these harangues. They 

 were adapted to the occasion, and calculated to im- 

 press the soldiers with the justice of their cause, or 

 to confirm their hatred to the enemy. By such ora- 

 tions they were often animated with new life and 

 courage ; and sometimes retrieved their affairs, when 

 desperate, in consequence of a seasonable appeal to 

 their passions and patriotism. The great generals of 

 antiquity were too well acquainted with the effect of 

 these harangues to omit them on any important oc- 

 casion ; and they were followed by a shout from the 

 soldiery, which still further stimulated their courage. 

 Haranguing the army, war cries, and shouts, were 

 common to all nations ; and Tacitus has preserved 

 the speech of Galgacus to our barbarous forefathers, 

 before they engaged Agricola's army in the battle 

 of the Grampians. In latter ages, the feudal chief- 

 tains of Scotland also observed this custom, and each 

 clan had its peculiar viar-tong, called sluggan, slog- 

 gan, or slug/torn, which are corruptions of the Gaelic 



Sluagh Oban, i. e. the xuar.-song. These sluagh- 

 orans were sometimes composed of a few words, and 

 sometimes were of consid. k: . (J t" the first 



kind is tulloch ard, ft. e. the hig/i hill,) which was 

 the war-cry of the Mack nzies ; Loehow, (i. c. the 

 water of the lech,) the war-cry of the Campbells; 

 and of the latter kind is the speech of Galgacus, 

 vliich may have been repeated to the Romans by the 



Battle. 



Caledonian bards, who were the composers of such 



pieces, and therefore not altogether a fiction of the v - "-" 



historians, as generally imagined. 



The invention of gunpowder introduced a new era 

 in the annals of war ; and, from the difference of the 

 armour of the ancients and moderns, a difference in 

 the disposition of an army in battle necessarily result- 

 ed. The power of artillery, and even of small arms, 

 rendered the phalanx, or deep column, totally useless, 

 as the physical strength of men is of no avail against 

 a ball projected by the force of gunpowder. Al- 

 though the nature of the weapons now employed re- 

 quire a disposition in battle different from that of the 

 most skilful captains of antiquity, yet the same prin- 

 ciple that guided the tactics of Epaminondas and 

 Philip has been successfully adopted by some of the 

 most celebrated generals of modern times. To ren- 

 der the assault irresistible in one point, that the con- 

 fusion produced there might be communicated to the 

 whole line, was the object of the Theban hero, when 

 he led his column in the shape of a wedge to attack 

 the Lacedemonians ; and the phalanx of Philip of . 

 Muccdon, in the battle of Chacronea, from the same 

 cause, produced similar consequences. 



Frederick of Prussia imitated and improved the Battles of 

 tactics of these great men, and reduced their science Frederick 

 to a practical application that corresponded with mo- l ' le Glcilt - 

 dern weapons. The at.ack in flank, which had been 

 considered as only incidental, became the principal 

 action in his battles ; and to form unforeseen and skil- 

 ful dispositions in the moment of onset, or during 

 the engagement, constituted his system in the field : 

 the principle of which is, that a greater front can be 

 brought to act against a smaller ; and thus an army, 

 inferior in number, may surpass the enemy in exer- 

 tion on these particular points, where the attack is 

 likely to prove decisive. 



Frederick's judicious disposition of his battalions, 

 and his seizing the critical moment to attack the 

 enemy in flank, decided the battle of Craslau ; and 

 by similar manoeuvres, he defeated the Austrians in 

 the battle of Hohenfriedberg. In the battle of Sohr, 

 the success of his cavalry enabled the Prussian infan- 

 try to carry the Austrian batteries, and to turn and 

 attack the flank of their army, which decided the 

 victory. In the battle of Rosbach he displayed the 

 same manoeuvres, and the same promptitude of ac- 

 tion. The enemy's army /.as composed of battalions 

 ananged alternately in column and in line ; but his 

 right flank was unsupported ; and Frederick, adopt- 

 ing Cxtar's plan at the battle of Pharsalia, traversed 

 his left wing with two battalions. The enemy ad- 

 vancing to the attack, these battalions wheeled half a 

 circle to the right, which threw them on his flank. 

 The French, being galled by the fire of the Prus- 

 sians, pressed towards the left, which made the co- 

 lumns and battalions a heavy and compressed line, 

 that was exposed to the discharges of the whole Prus- 

 sian irout. By this judicious disposition of Frede- 

 rick's battle, a handful of men overcame a great ar- 

 my. In the decisive battle of Leuthen, the disposi- 

 tion and nianccuvres of the Prussians were exact Ij si- 

 milar to these of the Theband in i 

 tra. Their right wing threatened to in 



