82 The Tariff and the Farmer. 



other printed communication of changes in prices. These 

 are very liable to fall into the hands of consumers.'' 

 ''We hope that during the year an additional number of 

 our members will adopt the system of adding to the fac- 

 tory cost of goods a proper percentage to cover the 

 expense of distribution before arriving at the true cost. ' ' 

 ■ Not onlv are the manufacturers often in collusion to 

 prevent all competition among independent factories, 

 but they can control price through the intermediate 

 hands that pass the goods on to the consumer. By this 

 means the trading world, both wholesaler and retailer, 

 come in for an equal degree of the high profits of the 

 producer. Protection shields all, and the accumulative 

 artificial increase of price is borne by the farmer with no 

 offset of advantage. 



Besides the desire to obtain the highest possible profits, 

 manufacturers often have another strong incentive to 

 hold them to their mutual agreements. The nature of 

 this is indicated by a little item found in the New York 

 Semi-weekly Evening Post of Jan. 16, 1902: ''The lead- 

 ing producers of wire and wire nails ' ' held a conference 

 at Pittsburg. After agreeing to advance the price of 

 nails comes this sentence: "Forfeits of $10,000 for each 

 concern were posted to bind to the agreed price and to 

 stop the price cutting." 



How far combinations have extended in the industrial 

 world is indicated by "the unanimous report of the com-' 

 mittee on commercial law of the American Bar Associa- 

 tion," made at its annual meeting in 1903. Here are 

 extracts: "The modern combination's primary object is 

 to control trade and commerce in plain articles of pro- 

 duction, and substitute a more or less perfect monopoly 

 in the place of a more or less free competition. It 



