( 19 ) 



Rising prices and scarcity of potatoes during April reduced 

 consumption even more. By May 1 there was available only 

 about one sixth of a pound of old potatoes per day. Consump- 

 tion declined primarily because of a lack of potatoes. 



Although the average consumption declined during April 

 and May 1943, the decrease was by no means uniform. Many 

 ate more potatoes than usual to save their blue coupons 

 and/or their supplies of processed vegetables; others ate as 

 usual. Others must have eaten much less, and many ate none. 

 The hogs most certainly ate less. This was not equality of 

 sacrifice. Some large hospitals in potato areas of central New 

 York did not serve potatoes for almost a month. Many fam- 

 ilies were unable to buy old potatoes. A goodly proportion 

 of the armed forces in this country were without potatoes 

 for several weeks. They were fed rice, spaghetti, parsnips, 

 hominy grits, macaroni, and the like. It was difficult even 

 to get potatoes to provision outgoing boats. In New York 

 City late potatoes brought as much as ten dollars per hun- 

 dred-pound sack in black markets. This was over four times 

 the ceiling price at near-by shipping points. 



The acute potato situation in the spring of 1943 indicated 

 clearly that setting low ceiling prices is not necessarily serv- 

 ing the best interests of the consumer. The government could 

 hardly have set a more favorable stage for a rapid disposal 

 of the 1942-3 potato crop. By the low ceiling prices, unac- 

 companied by the rationing of potatoes and accompanied 

 by the rationing of dried, dehydrated, and canned vege- 

 tables, the government in effect told the people to eat 

 the potatoes just as rapidly as possible. The 125 million peo- 

 ple 3 did what the government, through prices, told them 

 to do. 



The government, through too low ceiling prices, rationed 

 out the potatoes at too rapid a rate. Black-market operators, 



8 Allowance made for 11 million men in the service. 



