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intended. The weatherman was very co-operative through- 

 out the year. The abandoned acreage was small and the yields 

 of the harvested acreage 3 the highest in history. This un- 

 usual combination produced a crop 25 per cent above nor- 

 mal. 4 



Between spring and fall a fickle weatherman can give us 

 a crop 15-25 per cent below normal or a crop 15-25 per cent 

 above normal. This is not a theory ; it is a fact. It has hap- 

 pened in the United States. 



In the spring of 1943 the farmers planned to plant 229 

 million acres, 2 compared with 219 million in 1942. This was 

 a substantial increase. However, this optimism was short- 

 lived. During the spring of 1943 the weatherman was a non- 

 co-operator and the farmers planted only 218 million acres. 2 

 This was eleven million acres less than they intended and 

 one million less than they planted the previous year. 



The government dictates the acreage goals; the farmers 

 dictate the intentions to plant; the farmer and the weather- 

 man compromise on the acreage actually planted; and the 

 weatherman dictates the acreage that shall be harvested and 

 the yield per acre. The most the government can do is some 

 paper work. The rest is in the hands of the farmer and the 

 capricious, unpredictable weatherman. 



Incentives Important to Production 



Probably a continuation of the production of 90-95 per 

 cent of the nation's food is assured for the duration regard- 

 less of low ceiling prices relative to urban wages. However, 

 the other 5-10 per cent depends on alternative opportunities. 

 This marginal food is the most expensive part of our supply. 

 It is not only as important as any other part, but it is espe- 

 cially important in tune of war that we produce all that is 

 possible. It is also very important that all that is produced 



2 Based on 14 crops. 3 Based on 28 crops. 4 Based on 53 crops. 



