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is saved. Unharvested crops are more frequently an indica- 

 tion of low prices than of labor shortage. In order to main- 

 tain food production, incomes in agriculture must be com- 

 mensurate with incomes in other industries. If the incentive 

 prices is high, farmers will put forth their maximum 

 effort for over-all food production. 



For some commodities this was recognized. Following Pearl 

 Harbor imports of vegetable oils declined and the govern- 

 ment undertook to expand the acreage of soybeans for oil. 

 Soybeans compete with corn. In 1940 a bushel of soybeans 

 was worth 1.5 bushels of corn, and the following year the 

 farmers planted 5.9 million acres of soybeans. The govern- 

 ment's support price raised prices of soybeans relative to 

 corn, and a bushel of soybeans was worth more than two 

 bushels of corn. The 1942 acreage of soybeans increased to 

 10.8 million acres. 



Another instance of the effective use of the price incentive 

 was the United States Department of Agriculture's support 

 prices for butter to the end that production be maintained 

 or increased. The butter deal was one instance in which the 

 Department of Agriculture wisely made a reputation as an 

 inflationist. 



The policy regarding red kidney beans was less realistic. 

 The government wanted more red kidney beans, but prices 

 were held so low for the past season or two that in the spring 

 of 1943 farmers in the major red-kidney-bean sections of 

 New York State planted about 20 per cent less than the 

 previous year. Of course, the number of producers of red 

 kidney beans is small and their aggregate contribution to 

 the nation's food supply is not large. With declining con- 

 sumer supplies of animal protein food, however, there will 

 be urgent need for the expansion of vegetable proteins, of 

 which beans are a great source. The red kidney, the pea, and 

 the lima bean are highly prized because of their palatability. 



