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Prices have been more successful in stimulating produc- 

 tion than have exhortations. The government appealed to 

 the farmers to produce more hogs and more corn. Hog prices 

 were more favorable than corn prices. In fact, the price situa- 

 tion for hogs was so favorable that the farmers' expansion 

 program exceeded the government's requests. The price in- 

 centive was so strong that in the spring of 1943, the War Food 

 Administrator urged the farmers not to increase the breeding 

 of sows and gilts more than 15 per cent. There were estimates 

 that some Corn Belt farmers planned a 50-per-cent expan- 

 sion. To the extent that the government said it wanted some- 

 thing and then paid a stimulating price, it chose the correct 

 means of accomplishing the objective. 



The government kept down the price of corn, and in the 

 spring of 1943 the farmers planned to increase the acreage of 

 corn only 6 per cent. 



The 1943 sugar-beet goal was the same as in 1942, but the 

 price of sugar has not risen in proportion to wages, and the 

 farmers intended to plant 30 per cent less beets than in 1942. 

 They actually planted 39 per cent less, the smallest acreage 

 since 1922. This equals about 750,000 tons of urgently needed 

 sugar. 



The only potent incentive to increased production is the 

 dollar. The farmers and Congress want price to be the incen- 

 tive. The administration, which favors price-fixing, wants 

 subsidies. 



Our National Crop Policy Change 



During the horse-and-buggy days the nation had no agri- 

 cultural production policy other than to make two blades 

 of grass grow where one grew before. This was a good policy. 

 It was the only way the farmer had to increase his wealth, 

 and no satisfactory substitute has yet been found. 



For a decade beginning in 1932 our agricultural production 



