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scarcity policy have been placed in charge of the expansion 

 program. 



Changes were made in our policies on crop acreage, but 

 they were made late. Changes were made in our policy on 

 farm labor, but they, too, were late. Changes are being made 

 in our farm-machinery policy, also belatedly. We have finally 

 come to realize that production must be stimulated. Some 

 folks credit the planners with seeing the difficulties and mak- 

 ing the changes. Others contend that they did nothing until 

 shortages occurred, when the force of public opinion com- 

 pelled them to make changes. If the latter point of view is 

 correct, those in charge of our food strategy were weather- 

 vanes rather than administrators. 



We Have Outgrown Our Policy on Crop Production 



By far the most important government food program for 

 1943 is still that of the A A A. Some contend that the support- 

 price programs are more effective. However, for most prod- 

 ucts support prices are below the market prices. 



The AAA program was originally a farm relief measure de- 

 signed to assist the depressed state of agriculture. The pro- 

 gram, with amendments, has been continued despite the in- 

 creased need for food and the decreased need for relief. 



The AAA has used crop allocation and marketing quotas 

 to restrict the production of some crops. We are restricting 

 the cotton acreage from which cottonseed oil, an important 

 vegetable fat, is obtained and which is now so scarce that 

 it must be rationed. Paying farmers not to produce cotton- 

 seed oil does not assure us that more of the other vegetable 

 oils will be produced. 



Parity payments may have some justification in time of 

 agricultural stress, but have little to recommend them in time 

 of war. In fact, the government agencies are operated at 

 cross-purposes. The AAA attempted to raise farm incomes 



