( 67 ) 



by parity payments, and OPA tried to hold down prices, and 

 thereby farm income. 



As a distress measure, the nation devised a soil-conser- 

 vation program purportedly in the interest of future food 

 supplies. Despite the war, much of the old AAA policy to 

 conserve the soil for future generations was still in force 

 during the summer of 1943. It has been stated that farm- 

 ers can plant crops of their own choosing. It is true that 

 penalties for excess planting of corn have been eliminated; 

 but considerable indirect control still exists by classifying 

 certain crops as "war crops" for which AAA payments are 

 made. It will be difficult to eliminate the national, state, and 

 local interests involved in this program. 



When the nation is at war and denuding itself of its man- 

 power and other natural resources, there is little reason to 

 continue a program of soil conservation at the expense of 

 much-needed current supplies of food. The best of our man- 

 power, mines, and forests are drafted for the war effort. Can 

 there be any objection to mining the soil for a few years when 

 food is so scarce? 



We Should Be Realistic about Food Production 



In time of war the food strategy should not be based on 

 a year like 1942, when the acreage planted was high, the 

 abandonment low, and the yields the highest in history. The 

 year 1942 was one of those rare ones when the pictures in 

 the seed catalogues came true. Only an optimist would base a 

 wartime food policy on the pictures in a seed catalogue. In 

 time of war we should be realists instead of optimists. We 

 should base our estimates of future crop production on the 

 assumption that (a) either there would not be sufficient 

 labor and/or machinery, and/or favorable spring weather to 

 plant all the acres that the goals call for or the intentions 

 indicate, and that (b) the weatherman would be a non-co- 



