( 82 ) 



them), compared with five sacks under normal conditions 

 for many hogs. 



A somewhat similar situation prevailed for prices of other 

 livestock products and other high-protein feeds. For instance, 

 in 1942 a can of milk would buy about a sack of oil meal, 

 compared with about three fourths of a sack under normal 

 conditions. 



Since the country's livestock receives about half as much 

 high-protein feed as recommended for efficient production, 

 and the high-protein-feed price ratios were favorable, there 

 was no force restricting the farmers from improving the 

 standard of living of their livestock except the amount of 

 high-protein feed available. The obvious effect of these re- 

 lationships was to encourage the feeding of protein feeds at 

 rates that could not be maintained. 



Protein Feeds Low Relative to Other Feed Prices 



Normally, high-protein feeds sell at much higher prices 

 than corn meal. For instance, from 1926 to 1930 a ton of lin- 

 seed meal was worth 29 per cent more than a ton of corn meal. 

 Early in 1943 a ton of linseed meal sold for less than a ton 

 of corn meal. Similarly, a ton of soybean meal sold for less 

 than a ton of corn meal. In the spring of 1943 a 20-per-cent- 

 protein ration was cheaper than the less appetizing and less 

 nutritious 16-per-cent ration. Such relationships would nat- 

 urally stimulate the rate of feeding of oil meals in the Corn 

 Belt, where tankage and meat scraps may be in short supply. 



For safety, the feed manufacturer normally included a 

 margin of perhaps one half of one per cent extra protein in 

 a 16-per-cent ration. With the low prices of high-protein 

 feeds, a 16-per-cent ration might include as much as 18 to 19 

 per cent of protein. Assisted by OP A, which lowered the 

 prices, by the manufacturer, who increased the protein in 

 his ration, and by the feeders, who increased the ration, live- 



