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started to rise in December 1942 despite the huge crop that 

 had just been harvested. Based on a common-sense economy, 

 this was as it should have been. Livestockmen would have 

 taken warning and started to think about curbing the expan- 

 sion of their herds and flocks. However, the government had 

 the problem of stopping inflation and continuing its avowed 

 policy of encouraging livestock production. On January 12, 

 1943 OP A froze prices of corn, our most important feed grain, 

 in every future, cash, and local market throughout the coun- 

 try at the highest prices prevailing the preceding day. This 

 encouraged the further expansion of livestock. As the ceiling 

 prices on the high-protein feeds accelerated their disappear- 

 ance, the ceiling price on corn had a similar effect on feed 

 grains. 



A shortage of feed grains will disturb poultrymen and 

 dairymen in deficit areas more than a shortage of high-pro- 

 tein feed. If feed grains are available and high-protein feed 

 is scarce, farmers can feed more pounds of a lower-protein 

 ration. If there is a shortage of feed grains, however, there 

 is no substitute except the dairyman's excess stocks of hay 

 and silage. 



A shortage of feed grains for dairymen and poultrymen in 

 deficit areas developed at a more rapid rate than that at 

 which the total supply of feed grains disappeared. Grain 

 farmers or livestockmen in the Middle West with excess 

 grain were disgruntled with the $1.00% for September corn 

 in Chicago and placed a higher "reservation price" on their 

 cribs of corn. In the modern lingo, these farmers have a 

 high "priority," and the priority ratings of the New York 

 dairyman and the Pacific coast poultryman were far down 

 the line. 



The problem of the livestockman is more likely to be get- 

 ting grain than the price of grain. The first reaction of most 

 consumers to frozen prices is favorable. All consumers like 



