( 131 ) 



much, and that the paramount problem is to provide an at- 

 tractive diet for the few rather than to fill the stomachs of 

 the many, a continuation of our present agricultural policy 

 is justified. 



If the problem is to feed the many rather than the few, 

 the most effective way of making large amounts of food 

 available for export year after year is by reducing livestock 

 production. In that case our present policy cannot be con- 

 tinued. 



The forecasts would indicate that there are tentative plans 

 to export fifteen to twenty per cent of our 1943 food produc- 

 tion, which is equivalent to feeding about 25 million addi- 

 tional persons at our dinner tables. If this is merely a tem- 

 porary palliative, it could be accomplished by (a) exporting 

 part of our surplus wheat, (b) exporting wheat imported 

 from Canada, or (c) exporting some combination of grain 

 and highly prized foods. Of course such plans would be of a 

 temporary nature. If the program were to be of extended 

 duration, it would be necessary to reduce livestock produc- 

 tion by about fifteen per cent. 



Only by feeding its cereal grains directly to human beings 

 rather than to animals can the United States provide large 

 amounts of food to distressed peoples over an extended pe- 

 riod of time. 



War is not the time to shift from energy foods to pro- 

 tective foods. Time concluded that "The U. S. decision to 

 upgrade the feeding habits of the world . . . will turn out 

 to have been one of the costliest decisions of World War II." 2 



Civilians Must Learn to Eat Grain and Like It 



The army understands the relationship between high mo- 

 rale and a well-filled stomach and does its best to supply the 

 soldier with an ample, attractive, nutritious diet. The ris- 



2 Time, Volume XLI, Number 19 (May 10, 1943), page 21. 



