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able degree of confidence because they have been trained to 

 meet such problems. 



There is the problem of logistics for civilians as well as 

 for soldiers. The 125 million civilians must have food, pro- 

 vided at the proper time and place and in the required 

 amounts. Although this nation trains thousands of men in 

 the logistics of moving military supplies for a few million 

 men, it has not trained the millions of men required for the 

 logistics of food supplies for 125 million civilians under a 

 system of price-fixing, priorities, rationing, and subsidies. 

 The nearest approach to such training was a short course in 

 regimentation during the early stages of the New Deal under 

 the direction of General Hugh Johnson, Leon Henderson, 

 and others of NRA. 



In time of peace the logistics of civilian food supplies was 

 a relatively simple problem because these supplies were au- 

 tomatically allocated by the price system. Furthermore, 

 there were plenty of persons experienced in civilian logistics. 

 Armour and Company, General Foods, Standard Brands, 

 Quaker Oats, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company 

 down to Mr. Perugilla, who with his wife runs the corner 

 grocery store, all know their logistics under a price mech- 

 anism. 



Another distinction between military and civilian logis- 

 tics is cost and wastage. Military logistics tends to ignore 

 costs and wastage because it is so important not to be short 

 of food anywhere any time. Military logistics is a problem 

 of having more food than is needed regardless of cost or wast- 

 age. It is a physical rather than an economic problem. 



Since military logistics involves a small part of our popu- 

 lation, the nation can carry such costs and wastage without 

 "cracking up." In time of war we tolerate these high costs 

 and wastage because it is necessary and excusable if we are 

 to win the battles. On the home front it is not possible to 



