39 



munication and understanding of ants depends solely upon the 

 mobility of their antennae. It is apparent that they serve to a cer- 

 tain extent for the demonstration of the principal emotional fea- 

 ture and motives, as, for instance, for charming and caressing 

 opposite sexual mates; furthermore, they may also represent the 

 faculties of touch and smell. 



It seems rather erroneous to suppose that the antennas of ants 

 possess the faculty symbolizing by their different forms of motion 

 every form of instinctive and rational transaction and other simi- 

 lar features prevailing in various modes within their organiza- 

 tion. Moreover, it seems more probable that the main part of 

 demonstration and communication bases on thought transference 

 and the principles of intuition. Those naturalists, ascribing all 

 intellectual and expressive transaction to the antennas, and in some 

 respects to the laws of inheritance, deny thereby intellectual, re- 

 flecting and reasoning faculties of ants as well as other insects. 



They claim that the intellectual transactions are more of an 

 automatical or mechanical character, inducted by an inherited 

 power, which works similar to a spring in a clock. This presump- 

 tion sets forth that a reasoning intellect is therefore not required, 

 and that ants and bees are not endowed with a constructive intelli- 

 gence, directing ideologically the course of individual evolution 

 and the welfare of their own and their progeny. 



But now, the anatomical constitution exhibits the presence 

 of senses, of which the most important is sight. The faculty of 

 sight serves to distinguish and select objects. The faculty of sight 

 implies logically the postulate of visuality, though visuality is an 

 attribute of intellect; these faculties form, therefore, essentially 

 the fundamental basis of the transcendental constitution of the 

 organic being. 



Now the motion (motive) of the individual to distinguish 

 and select an object rises from within the center of intelligence; 

 the scoped object is reflected on the physical organ of sight, that 

 is, the eye; from this the object becomes reflected to the innate 

 visuality, that is, the power of visuality subjectively copies the pic- 

 torial outlines of the object from the organ of sight the copy, 

 that is, the ideal form, drawn from the corporeal object, becomes 

 stored within the transcendental periphery of the individual. 

 These visual copies become subjectively associated with the pre- 



