402 READINGS IN RURAL ECONOMICS 



of their fathers, who might exercise the right of disentaihng at 

 any moment, would be, as it were, bound over in heavy recog- 

 nisances to good behaviour. The chief difference from the eco- 

 nomical point of view would be, that by virtue of the same right 

 the ostensible owner of a property might charge it for his debts 

 to its full value, instead of only to the value of his life interest. 

 It is, however, incredible that, under such a law, the passion for 

 making eldest sons would remain unabated. Since younger chil- 

 dren would be consigned to beggary, where the father's property 

 consisted solely or mainly of land, unless they were given shares 

 of it or charges upon it, a universal custom of breaking entails 

 for this purpose would probably spring up, and apportionments so 

 made out of a fee-simple estate would almost inevitably be far 

 less influenced by the spirit of primogeniture than re-settlements 

 of the prevailing type. 



But, having gone thus far, how can we avoid going one step 

 further ? It is self-evident that if life-estates were destroyed, no 

 freehold estates would remain, but estates-tail in possession and 

 estates in fee-simple. Now, since estates-tail in possession are 

 convertible into estates in fee-simple at the will of the owner, who 

 has usually the strongest motive for so converting them, it would 

 appear that very little can be either gained or lost by retaining 

 them. We are, therefore, once more brought face to face with 

 the prior and larger question, whether any freehold estate in land 

 short of absolute ownership should be recognised by the law. 

 This question is not to be disposed of by dogmatic assertions 

 that whatever rule be applied to realty must be applied to person- 

 alty likewise. To such assertions a controversialist might rejoin 

 that personalty and realty have not in past times been treated by 

 the law on this footing of equality. For instance, the heir taking 

 all the land on intestacy was specially exempted from the rule 

 that sums advanced to sons in their father's lifetime should be 

 deducted from their shares at his death, while, by a monstrous 

 perversion of justice, a mortgage debt contracted on the security 

 and for the benefit of the land, was primarily chargeable on the 

 personal estate until Mr. Locke King's act was passed in 1854. 

 This, however, is not the place to multiply proofs of the partiality 



