90 Tin-: TUEATY OF 'WASHINGTON. 



Ilanly, as avoU as ]\[r. j\II11, ^vllo spoke on tlie other 

 side of the general question, said that the charge was 

 "not law," and was "without legal authority." j\Ir. 

 Fiulason, a most coinj)etent authority, said that, " al- 

 tliou'di tlie eliarrre dealt so larjzely in denunciation," 

 it was "utterly indeterminate and indecisive;" that 

 "it avowed a state of entire doubt;" that, though 

 "there was much denunciation of law laid down [l)y 

 others], there was no positive declaration of law laid 

 down by the Chief Justice." The same writer also 

 l)oints out grave mistakes of history as well as errors 

 of law in tliis charge. Tluis, the Chief Justice as- 

 sumes, as a cardinal thought, that mat'tial law and 

 luilltanj law are one and the same thing: a mistake, 

 which implies extraordinary confusion of mind, for- 

 getfulness of his own ollicial opinions in the inci- 

 dents of the rebellion in Ceylon, and ignorance of 

 tlie most commonplace events of English history, for 

 instance, as detailed in Ilallam and ]\Iacaulay. 



I allude to these criticisms for the reason that, as 

 will appear in the sequel, the same singular intellect- 

 \ial traits and moral characteristics of the Chief Jus- 

 tice, which became conspicuous at Geneva, had shown 

 themselves on the Queen's Bench, and had attracted 

 the notice of his fellow-countrymen. 



I refer to this chai'ge for another cause. It is difli- 

 cult for many reasons to measure the exact iKvmnal 

 value of ordinary legal opinions delivered, in the 

 course of adjudication, by any judge of the Queen's 

 Bench. All such dilUcultics cease when he goes out 

 of his way to deliver a demonstrative charge to a 



