l-i-t THE THEATY OF WASHINGTON. 



out jiaHsiiiL; to consider ■wlictlier tlicse observations 

 nrc piTtV'ctly accurate or not as a tlcfinltlon of tlic law 

 of nations, we may assume tliat tliey are substantially 

 so, and sullicc at any rate to show clearly tbe iirican- 

 did spirit of Sir Alexander's criticism of the imputed 

 'languai^e of ]Mr. Sticmpili, — a criticism which calls to 

 mind a similar unjust and vicious reproach cast by 

 Junius on Lord Mansfield. 



The actual statement of ISlv. StuMnpili, as we have 

 seen, M'as ime\cei)tionably accurate and ])recise, in so 

 far as rei^'arded the matters before the Tribunal. 



^Ieanwhile,Mr. J>t;empHi may have said orally, what 

 lie says here in ])rint, that in many supposable cases 

 of deficient e.\])licitnesH either of the conventional 

 rules or of the historic law of nations, "cVst au Tri- 

 bunal d'v sujvplcer en interpretant ct appliquant les 

 trois rei^les de son mieux et en (oute C(')isckn(:e.^'' 



That is what the Viscount of Itajuba says in one 

 of his opinions, namely, that a certain doctrine, assert- 

 ed by the British (rovernment, *' froisse la conscience." 

 It is what Count Sclopis intends, when he says, " Les 

 nations out entre elles nn droit commun, ou, si on aime 

 mieux, un lien vommnu, foritic ^xw rcqnile et sane- 

 tionne ]\'ir le ivsjK'ct des interets recipro([ues;" and 

 that such is the s]">irit of the TVeaty of AVashington, 

 "([ui ne fait (]ue donner la preference aux regies de 

 rtMjuite generale sur les dispositioiis d\nie legislation 

 particidiere quelle qu'cUe puisse etre." That is "the 

 luiiversal innnutable justice," which in all systems of 

 law, intei'iiational or national, distinguishes right fi'om 

 wrong, and to which the United States aj[)pealed in 



