22S 'i'lIE TUEATV OF WASHINGTON. 



glaiul gave to us good cause of runture ; we barely 

 escaped war Avith PVance in 179S; we were forced 

 into war with England in 1S12; and in the course 

 of all these events the hand of the Government was 

 restrained, if not jiaralyzed, by the factious force of 

 si///ij>((f/i/c.s in the United States, on the one side for 

 France and on the other for England. Hence, alike 

 in the (ji«(sf war^with the former, and the declared 

 war with the latter, the results as to the United States 

 were uncertain, imperfect, trivial even, compared with 

 the great objects which might have been acconqjlish- 

 ed by united counsels. 



On the side of France, however, it must be admit- 

 ted that our disj)osition to avoid pushing matters to 

 extremities contributed to gain for us the immense 

 benefit of the acquisition of Louisiana. , 



Afterward, although the Berlin and jMilan Decrees 

 of France and the Orders in Council of Great Britain 

 constituted each alike good cause of war with eithei', 

 yet the United States held back at vast sacrifice, until 

 continued assertion of the right to impress seamen on 

 board of our merchant ships, and, indeed, to visit our 

 ships-of-war, and other exaggerations of belligerent 

 right, forced us into war with Great Britain. 



The treaty by which that war was concluded is 

 one of the most unsatisfactory in Lhc annals of the 

 United States. It was absolutely silent in regard to 

 all the sjuljjects of controversy which had occasioned 

 the war. Nothinrc is said of the bellirjerent cncioach- 

 ments of Great Britain on the neutral ri^chts of tlie 

 United States, nothing of maritime search, nothing of 



